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I. INTRODUCING THE OTHER MARRIAGE EQUALITY PROBLEM 
What is “the other marriage equality problem”? A helpful point of departure 
for answering this question is a July 15, 2012, front-page story in the New York 
Times entitled Two Classes, Divided by ‘I Do’ and accompanied by the 
explanatory sub-caption: “Marriage, for Richer; Single Motherhood, for 
Poorer.”1 This lengthy article by Jason DeParle contrasted the lives of two 
“friendly white women from modest Midwestern backgrounds who left for 
college with conventional hopes of marriage, motherhood and career.”2 Jessica 
Schairer, a single mother who left college after becoming pregnant and 
cohabited with, but did not marry, her children’s now-absent father, bears 
alone “the challenges and responsibilities of raising three children.”3 Jessica is 
an employee of a married mother of two, Chris Faulkner, who “did standard 
things in standard order: high school, college, marriage and children.”4 DeParle 
asserts that what most separates these two women are not things like “the 
impact of globalization on their wages but a 6-foot-8-inch man named Kevin,” 
Chris’s husband.5 Chris and Kevin have “strength in numbers”: two incomes 
yield more resources and two parents yield more time for actively engaging in 
parenting and the extracurricular activities that “can enhance academic 
performance.”6 Using this portrait of two women’s lives to sound a cautionary 
note about family inequality, DeParle draws on sociologist Sara McLanahan’s 
warning (sounded in 2004) “that family structure increasingly consigns 
children to ‘diverging destinies.’”7 
The article doubtlessly secured its prime spot on the front page of the 
Sunday New York Times with the news that it is “white women with some 
postsecondary schooling but not a full college degree” who account for the 
greatest increase in non-marital births and single-parent households.8 The 
article caught my eye in part because its author, Jason DeParle, penned so 
many significant news stories during the protracted Congressional debates over 
welfare reform in the mid-1990s9 and, more recently, wrote an acclaimed book 
 
1 Jason DeParle, Two Classes, Divided by ‘I Do,’ N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2012, at A1. 
2 Id. 
3 Id.  
4 Id. 
5 Id.  
6 Id. (stressing Kevin’s involvement in the Boy Scouts and his sons’ other activities).  
7 Id. (quoting Sara McLanahan, Diverging Destinies: How Children Are Faring Under 
the Second Demographic Transition, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 607 (2004)). 
8 Id.  
9 See, e.g., Jason DeParle, Get to Work; the New Contract with America’s Poor, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 28, 1996, § 4, at 1; Jason DeParle, Sharp Increase Along the Borders of Poverty, 
N.Y. TIMES, March 31, 1994, at A18. 
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about the impact of welfare reform on three African American women in an 
extended family.10 It also reminded me of the warnings sounded by Charles 
Murray during those welfare debates in his provocative Wall Street Journal 
article, The Coming White Underclass.11 Indeed, DeParle’s article even 
mentions Murray’s newest book, Coming Apart: The State of White America, 
1960-2010.12 
DeParle’s story, which warns that family inequality is growing and that 
wealth separates the married from the unmarried, also drew my attention 
because it contrasted sharply with another type of media story about the future 
of marriage. Several months earlier, in January 2012, a vivacious and smiling 
woman graced the cover of Boston magazine in the story Single by Choice.13 
The article’s caption read: “This is Terri. She’s successful, happy, and at 38, 
just fine with never getting married. Ever.”14 The synopsis of the story read: 
When it comes to getting hitched, more Americans than ever before are 
saying “I don’t.” Singles now make up nearly half the adult population in 
this country, and new research suggests they’re happier, more social, and 
more active in the community than many of their wedded counterparts. 
Now if only their friends and family (oh, and while we’re at it, 
coworkers, benefits providers, and the federal government) would get off 
their back.15 
The magazine story profiled several happy women living seemingly full and 
fun lives, including Alice Stern, a fifty-two-year-old “‘spinner’” – not, she 
“defiantly” says, a “spinster” – who is planning a “knitting cruise to Nova 
Scotia” with her knitting friends.16 The various researchers surveyed confirmed 
that it is time to “rethink singledom” as simply a “stop on the way toward the 
happy ending,” and to stop emphasizing “the value of the marital bond above 
all others” and viewing marriage as a unique pillar of civil society.17 When 
“more of us than ever before are going it alone” – by choice, the story 
admonishes – it is time to question the cultural messages that tell us that 
“happiness and success come through our partnerships.”18 
 
10 See generally JASON DEPARLE, AMERICAN DREAM: THREE WOMEN, TEN KIDS, AND A 
NATION’S DRIVE TO END WELFARE (2004). 
11 Charles Murray, The Coming White Underclass, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 1993, at A14. I 
have written at length elsewhere about Murray’s article and the 1990s debates over welfare 
reform. See Linda C. McClain, “Irresponsible” Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 339 
(1996). 
12 DeParle, supra note 1 (citing CHARLES MURRAY, COMING APART: THE STATE OF 
WHITE AMERICA, 1960-2010 (2012)). 
13 Janelle Nanos, Single by Choice, BOSTON, Jan. 2012, at 46. 
14 Id. (caption appearing on the magazine’s cover). 
15 Id. at 46. 
16 Id. at 51. 
17 Id. at 50, 78, 80. 
18 Id. at 49. 
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These two contrasting stories about what is happening to marriage invite 
attention to the “other marriage equality problem.” To examine that problem, I 
will use two recent books as foils, Hanna Rosin’s The End of Men: And the 
Rise of Women19 (the anchor for this Symposium) and Charles Murray’s 
Coming Apart.20 By using the phrase, the “other marriage equality problem,” I 
mean to invite attention to issues about marital equality and inequality beyond 
that of gay men and lesbians’ access to the institution of civil marriage. That 
marriage equality problem is one, in my view, of basic fairness, justice, and 
rights, and I have written in support of such equality.21 In this Article, 
however, my concern is with the marriage equality problem that is captured in 
warnings about the growing class-based marriage divide and the “diverging 
destinies” of children that flow from these emerging patterns of family life.22 
Sara McLanahan and Christine Percheski powerfully capture this concern over 
the impact of class-based marriage inequality upon children with the phrase 
“the reproduction of inequalities.”23 Other scholars refer to the 
“intergenerational transmission” of advantage and disadvantage.24 Because 
Rosin’s and Murray’s books both address the class-based marriage divide, 
evaluating their books in tandem with one another, while also acknowledging 
their differences and limitations, helps to examine this other marriage equality 
problem. Murray’s book deliberately focuses on the fate of a growing slice of 
“white America” to provide evidence that America is “coming apart at the 
seams . . . of class.”25 Rosin’s book does not explicitly articulate such a focus, 
but the men and women she profiles appear to be primarily white.26 Moreover, 
she draws explicit parallels between the so-called “new American matriarchy” 
flowing from men’s job loss in the middle class and the prior emergence of a 
“virtual matriarchy” in poor black communities due to black men’s loss of 
factory jobs.27 By comparison, the literature on the growing class divide in 
family forms, which I also discuss in this Article, is more inclusive and does 
 
19 HANNA ROSIN, THE END OF MEN: AND THE RISE OF WOMEN (2012). 
20 MURRAY, supra note 12. 
21 See, e.g., JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS, 
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES 177-236 (2013); LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF 
FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY 155-90 (2006). 
22 See McLanahan, supra note 7, at 614-15. 
23 Sara McLanahan & Christine Percheski, Family Structure and the Reproduction of 
Inequalities, 34 ANN. REV. SOC. 257 (2008). 
24 See Molly A. Martin, Family Structure and the Intergenerational Transmission of 
Educational Advantage, 41 SOC. SCI. RES. 33 (2012). 
25 MURRAY, supra note 12, at 12-13.  
26 See, e.g., ROSIN, supra note 19, at 70-88.  
27 Id. at 88. In discussing men’s unemployment problems in Alexander City, Alabama, 
Rosin states that “[t]his script has played out once before in American culture,” referring to 
the exodus of black men from factory jobs, beginning in the 1970s, and the negative 
consequences for nuclear families and social institutions. Id. (citing WILLIAM JULIUS 
WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR (1996)). 
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not suggest, as Murray’s work seems to, that the marriage equality problem 
only warrants concern when it affects white Americans.28 
Warnings about growing family inequality and the “intergenerational 
transmission” or “reproduction” of that inequality warrant attention. We should 
care about the relationship between the family and the polity, as well as the 
role of civil society, more generally, in generating and sustaining the American 
experiment in “ordered liberty.”29 The urgent tone of Murray’s book stems in 
part from his concern about a class-based falling away among “white America” 
from the nation’s “founding virtues,” including the “bedrock” role of marriage 
in sustaining society.30 Although Rosin does not speak the language of civil 
society or of founding virtues, the portraits of modern relationships that she 
offers to illustrate that “[o]ur nation is splitting into two divergent societies, 
each with their own particular marriage patterns,” offer glimmerings of the toll 
the growing marriage divide takes on communities and families.31 In our 
political and constitutional order, families are a crucial place of social 
reproduction. They nurture children and prepare them for capable and 
responsible lives as good persons and good citizens.32 As I argue elsewhere, 
families share responsibility with other institutions of civil society and with 
government in a “formative project” of fostering the capacity for personal and 
democratic self-government.33 This formative project includes fostering the 
healthy development of and protecting children as “immature citizens” and 
preparing them for eventual full participation and cooperation as members of 
their communities and the polity.34 
At the same time, the Single by Choice story poses a different challenge to 
the place of marriage in society by asking: Who needs marriage? Who says 
that a stable, well-ordered society needs most people to marry? What if the 
unmarried – the single by choice – can and do contribute to civil society and 
civic virtue, perhaps even to a greater extent than the married?35 Moreover, 
 
28 To be fair to Murray, although his book focuses on whites as a means of making his 
case that the trends he warns about “exist independently of ethnic heritage,” he does include 
a chapter near the end where he attempts to “broaden the picture to include everyone.” 
MURRAY, supra 12, at 13, 269-77. 
29 On this relationship, see FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 21, at 81-111; MARY ANN 
GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 115-17 (1991); 
and MCCLAIN, supra note 21, at 50-56. 
30 MURRAY, supra note 12, at 134, 270-72. 
31 See, e.g., ROSIN, supra note 19, at 79-112. 
32 See generally MCCLAIN, supra note 21. 
33 Id. at 4-11. 
34 See FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 21, at 118-45; MCCLAIN, supra note 21, at 64-
68. For the term “immature citizens,” see Vivian E. Hamilton, Immature Citizens and the 
State, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1055. 
35 See Nanos, supra note 13, at 78 (referencing sociologist Eric Klinenberg’s view that 
single people “have social capital in spades”); id. (reporting that “it’s actually married 
people who have become increasingly isolated,” which has “resulted in a ‘short-circuiting of 
 926 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:921 
 
what if those affluent and successful Americans who remain single by choice 
also remain childless? If not only marriage but also parenthood are rejected by 
more and more of the most successful, then what happens to the literal 
reproduction on which society depends and to the social reproduction of those 
virtues, skills, and traits of character that support self-government in a 
constitutional democracy? The “who needs marriage” story, however, 
ultimately seems in tension with the marriage inequality story: the latter 
stresses that marriage, and parenting within marriage, are increasingly matters 
of class privilege, while the former casts doubt on the place of marriage, and 
children, in the lives of the more affluent. 
This Article also examines the relevance of gender roles and gender equality 
to the other marriage equality problem. This equality issue is not about equality 
among families and between generations, but about equality within marriage 
and between unmarried men and women. This gender dimension is evident in 
Rosin’s vignettes of contemporary “upended gender dynamics” on both sides 
of the marriage divide.36 The elite, she contends, negotiate the “seesaw 
marriage,” while the less affluent contend with “the new American matriarchy” 
among the married and unmarried alike.37 This gender analysis, however 
imperfect, is one of the most intriguing parts of her exposition of the “end of 
men.” 
Gender dynamics are also a focus of Murray’s book. Notably, both Murray 
and Rosin suggest that a basic problem with respect to the growing marriage 
divide lies in male irresponsibility.38 To be sure, Rosin is more attentive to 
structural and economic factors affecting men than Murray, who stresses men’s 
falling away from the founding virtues.39 Working within a heterosexual 
frame, their work presents the following questions: When economic and social 
factors force a change in roles within the family and the workplace, how do 
men and women cope? If women and men aspire to an egalitarian marriage, 
how well does that work? Are men ready for such equality? Are women? 
McLanahan’s thesis about “diverging destinies” is instructive on such gender 
dynamics since she identified class-based differences not only in men’s and 
women’s relative bargaining power in intimate relationships but also in the 
belief in and availability of egalitarian marriage.40 
In Part II my exposition of the other marriage equality problem begins with 
McLanahan’s diagnosis of the “diverging destinies” of children as class 
 
community ties’ within contemporary society” (quoting NATALIA SARKISIAN & NAOMI 
GERSTEL, NUCLEAR FAMILY VALUES, EXTENDED FAMILY LIVES: THE POWER OF RACE, 
CLASS, AND GENDER 40 (2012))).  
36 ROSIN, supra note 19, at 91. 
37 See id. at 47-77, 79-112. 
38 MURRAY, supra note 12, at 155-56, 216; ROSIN, supra note 19, at 91. 
39 Compare ROSIN, supra note 19, at 8-10, with MURRAY, supra note 12, at 134-37. 
40 See McLanahan, supra note 7. I undertake a discussion of these gender dynamics infra 
Part II.A. 
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disparities widen. I then look back to the late 1990s and early 2000s to discuss 
how the low rate of marriage among low-income parents, as well as an evident 
gap between their marital aspirations and their marital practices – the same gap 
detailed in the work by McLanahan and her colleagues on “fragile families” – 
preoccupied federal lawmakers debating welfare reform and welfare 
reauthorization. Recent studies, I then show, view “Middle America”41 as 
increasingly part of the marriage “have nots,” individuals who fail to achieve 
their marital aspirations and decouple parenthood from marriage. In Part III, I 
examine how Rosin’s book and related writing present the marriage divide and 
the related issue of gender dynamics. In Part IV, I turn to Murray’s analysis of 
the gap between the “new upper class,” in which marriage and other founding 
virtues remain intact and the “new lower class,” in which marriage is no longer 
the norm. More so than Rosin, Murray addresses implications of the marriage 
divide for children and society. I end the Article by offering some conclusions 
about the other marriage equality problem. 
II. WHAT IS THE OTHER MARRIAGE EQUALITY PROBLEM AND WHY SHOULD 
SOCIETY CARE? 
In this Part I will explicate the other marriage equality problem. My primary 
sources are Sara McLanahan’s influential 2004 article42 as well as other work 
by McLanahan and her colleagues on the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing 
Study;43 a 2010 Pew Research Center report;44 and recent State of Our Unions 
reports, produced by the National Marriage Project, which sound alarms about 
the decline of marriage in Middle America and the rise of “fragile families.”45 
My goal here is not to offer a thorough review of the extensive literature on 
class and family formation. My co-panelists Naomi Cahn and June Carbone 
 
41 For use of this term, see NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT & INST. FOR AM. VALUES, THE 
STATE OF OUR UNIONS: MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 2012: THE PRESIDENT’S MARRIAGE AGENDA 
(2012) [hereinafter STATE OF OUR UNIONS 2012]. This report describes “Middle America” as 
“the nearly 60 percent of Americans aged 26 to 60 who have a high school but not a four-
year college degree.” Id. at 2. 
42 See McLanahan, supra note 7. 
43 See Christina M. Gibson-Davis et al., High Hopes but Even Higher Expectations: The 
Retreat from Marriage Among Low-Income Couples, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1301 (2005). 
See generally About the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, FRAGILE FAMILIES & 
CHILD WELLBEING STUDY, http://www.fragilefamilies.princeton.edu/about.asp (last visited 
May 12, 2013). 
44 PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND RISE OF NEW FAMILIES (2010), 
available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/11/pew-social-trends-2010-families. 
pdf. 
45 STATE OF OUR UNIONS 2012, supra note 41, at xi-xiii; id. at 89-90 (discussing a 
substantial decline in the “percentage of children under age 18 living with two married 
parents”); NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT & INST. FOR AM. VALUES, THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS: 
MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 2010: WHEN MARRIAGE DISAPPEARS: THE NEW MIDDLE AMERICA 
(2010) [hereinafter STATE OF OUR UNIONS 2010].  
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have done much to bring this topic (and literature) into family law and policy 
discussions.46 Instead, I want to get the basic outline of the problem on the 
table so readers will be able to consider Rosin’s and Murray’s analyses in light 
of this sociological backdrop. One aim of my exposition is to show the 
migration from a focus on the disappearance of marriage among low-income 
parents to a concern that the marriage divide affects a growing swath of 
Americans. 
A. Diverging Destinies and the Marriage Divide 
One reason the class-based marriage-inequality problem garners such acute 
attention is the impact the growing divide has on children. Thus, the subtitle of 
McLanahan’s influential 2004 article explains whose destinies are diverging: 
“How Children Are Faring Under the Second Demographic Transition.”47 
McLanahan explains that the first demographic transition took place from the 
early 1880s through the early 1900s, when “mortality and fertility declined and 
investment in child quality grew” in western industrialized countries.48 Both 
rich and poor children, she observes, benefited from this increased investment 
in children. In the 1950s children “were more likely than those growing up 100 
years earlier to live in traditional nuclear families, to be in good health, and to 
attend school.”49 The second demographic transition, McLanahan explains, 
“began around 1960” and includes such trends as “delays in fertility and 
marriage; increases in cohabitation, divorce, and nonmarital childbearing; and 
increases in maternal employment.”50 “How children are faring” under this 
transition, she asserts, “is less certain,” since “[s]ome of these trends, like 
delays in childbearing, imply gains in parental resources”; “others, like divorce 
and nonmarital childbearing, imply losses”; and “others, like increased 
maternal employment, suggest both.”51 
One purpose of McLanahan’s article was to challenge the public’s 
impression that it is “highly educated women” – like the television character 
Murphy Brown, whom Vice President Dan Quayle criticized in 1992 for 
becoming a single mother52 – who are driving “changes in family formation,” 
 
46 See NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, FAMILY CLASSES (forthcoming 2013) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter CAHN & CARBONE, FAMILY CLASSES]; NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, 
RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE 118 
(2010) [hereinafter CAHN & CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES] (“[T]he ability to 
marry has become an even greater marker of class.”); June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, The 
End of Men or the Rebirth of Class?, 93 B.U. L. REV. 871, 878-80 (2013). 
47 McLanahan, supra note 7 (emphasis added). 
48 Id. at 607. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 See, e.g., Peter Johnson, Murphy No Role Model, USA TODAY, May 20, 1992, at 1A 
(quoting Vice President Quayle: “It doesn’t help matters when primetime TV has Murphy 
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such as the increased number of nonmarital births.53 Instead, she reports, 
“college-educated women are more likely to marry than other women” and 
“less likely to divorce.”54 As a result, “trends in marriage, divorce, and single 
motherhood all contradict the argument that the most economically 
independent women are choosing single motherhood over marriage.”55 
McLanahan contends that “the forces that are driving the transition are leading 
to two different trajectories – with different implications for children. One 
trajectory – the one associated with delays in childbearing and increases in 
maternal employment – reflects gains in resources, while the other – the one 
associated with divorce and nonmarital childbearing – reflects losses.”56 These 
differing trajectories lead to “widening social-class disparities in children’s 
resources”: children born to “mothers from the most-advantaged backgrounds 
are making substantial gains in resources,” while “children born to mothers 
from the most disadvantaged backgrounds are making small gains and, in some 
instances, even losing parental resources.”57 
The comparative role of fathers is pertinent. Children of the most 
advantaged mothers are “born into stable unions and are spending more time 
with their fathers”; for those children born to the most disadvantaged mothers, 
by comparison, “their parents’ relationships are unstable, and for many, 
support from their biological father is minimal.”58 How does marriage factor 
into this story? When researchers look at fathers, they find that “although 
fathers’ involvement [with their children] has increased since 1965,”59 there 
are contemporary gaps. Since the 1980s married college-educated fathers 
spend the most time with their children as compared to (in order of decreasing 
child-parent contact) unmarried college-educated fathers, married fathers who 
 
Brown – a character who supposedly epitomizes today’s intelligent, highly paid, 
professional woman – mocking the importance of fathers by bearing a child alone and 
calling it just another lifestyle choice” (quotation marks omitted)). For more on Vice 
President Quayle’s famous “Murphy Brown” speech and the political aftermath, including 
the Vice President’s office subsequently praising Brown for showing “pro-life” and “strong 
family values” because she did not terminate her pregnancy and describing single mothers 
as “true heroes and inspirations,” see McClain, supra note 11, at 349-50, 396. 
53 McLanahan, supra note 7, at 607-08. 
54 Id. at 612 (emphasis omitted) (citing Joshua R. Goldstein & Catherine T. Kenney, 
Marriage Delayed or Marriage Forgone? New Cohort Forecasts of First Marriage for U.S. 
Women, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 506, 514 (2001); Steven P. Martin, Growing Evidence of a 
Divorce Divide? Education and Marital Rates in the U.S. Since the 1970s, at 27 tbl.2 (2004) 
(unpublished manuscript available at http://www.russellsage.org/sites/all/files/u4/Martin_Gr 
owing%20Evidence%20for%20a%20Divorce%20Divide.pdf)). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 608. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 612. 
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are not college-educated, and unmarried fathers who are not college 
educated.60 
McLanahan posits that second-wave feminism, namely its promotion of 
“women’s independence and gender equality on multiple fronts,” was among 
the causes of this second demographic transition.61 The changes that 
McLanahan links to feminism warrant mention, given the relevance of these 
changes to Rosin’s “end of men and rise of women” thesis, generally, and the 
possibility of egalitarian marriage, in particular. Feminism “provided women 
with an identity other than ‘wife’ and ‘mother’ and encouraged them to invest 
in education and careers, criticized the gender-role specialization that was the 
mainstay of traditional marriages and provided new standards for more-
egalitarian marriages, and argued against the stigmatization of single 
motherhood.”62 Feminism, as expressed in political activism, “fought gender 
discrimination in the labor force and higher education and argued that 
government should support women’s right to bear children and establish 
independent households.”63 McLanahan also speculates that feminism made 
college-educated men more “accepting of women’s demands for more-
egalitarian marriages.”64 
A familiar factor in the second demographic transition is women’s increased 
ability to control their fertility, due to the pill and legalized abortion.65 
Strikingly, McLanahan contends that these trends also have made it “easier for 
men to shirk their paternal responsibilities,” a point that is also pertinent to 
Murray’s argument. How so? “Before the pill a woman could not afford to 
have sex with a man without obtaining a promise of marriage.”66 The pill 
reduced the risk of unplanned pregnancy, a deterrent to nonmarital sex, making 
it unnecessary for men to make such a promise in order to engage in 
nonmarital sex.67 In addition, the increased number of women willing “to 
engage in sexual relationships without a promise of marriage lowered the 
bargaining power of women who wanted to marry and have children.”68 And 
“social norms about the acceptability of single motherhood and women’s right 
to an abortion” reinforced these “changes in bargaining power.”69 Conservative 
theorists, it bears mentioning, speak about this shift in bargaining power in 
terms of women’s decreasing ability or willingness to serve as the traditional 
 
60 Id. at 612-14. 
61 Id. at 617. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. (citing George A. Akerlof et al., An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing in 
the United States, 111 Q.J. ECON. 277 (1996)). 
67 Id. 
68 Id.  
69 Id. 
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“gatekeepers of sexuality” and use sexual modesty and restraint to bring men 
to marriage.70 
Changes in labor market conditions are another factor in the demographic 
transition, with implications for marriage, women’s choices, and male 
“shirking.” McLanahan recounts the loss of jobs by low-skilled men during 
various recessions, which made men “less ‘marriageable’ in the eyes of 
women.”71 Growing wage inequality differentiated college-educated from high 
school-educated men.72 These trends, as well as the narrowing of the gendered 
wage gap, “provided strong incentives for women to get a college education 
and enter the labor force.”73 These labor market conditions also “affected the 
family-formation behavior of women” who invested in careers.74 Some 
“decided to forgo motherhood entirely,” while “others delayed fertility until 
they were well established in their careers.”75 When those women were ready 
to have children, they “were in a much stronger bargaining position relative to 
men than were women with less education,” because they had “more options 
outside motherhood” and “were more mature and more knowledgeable about 
the kind of partnerships they wanted.”76 Moreover, “they had a great deal to 
offer their potential partners in terms of economic resources.”77 McLanahan 
ties those assets and bargaining power to such women’s ability to establish 
“more-egalitarian” partnerships with men that include features “valued by the 
feminist movement,” such as “emotional support and help with child 
rearing.”78 
Meanwhile, how did these market changes affect less-advantaged women? 
McLanahan claims that welfare policies for single mothers provide part of the 
answer. Because of the structure of welfare benefits, including the use of 
income testing, “when low-income mothers . . . worked or married, most of the 
money they earned and most of their partners’ income was deducted from their 
welfare benefits.”79 McLanahan argues that “economic theory suggests that 
 
70 See MCCLAIN, supra note 21, at 284-86 (discussing the commentary of David Popenoe 
on women as gatekeepers and the work of Leon and Amy Kass on the role of female sexual 
modesty); see also CAHN & CARBONE, FAMILY CLASSES, supra note 46 (manuscript at 76) 
(explaining that the work of “relatively liberal” economists Akerlof, Yellen, and Katz “set 
the stage” for conservative critiques, like that of Charles Murray, linking “the sexual 
revolution to the increase in male fecklessness”). McLanahan cites to Akerlof and his 
colleagues. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
71 McLanahan, supra note 7, at 617-18. 
72 Id. at 618. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id.  
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
 932 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:921 
 
welfare will increase nonmarital childbearing by making it easier for men to 
shirk their parental responsibilities.”80 The empirical literature finds the 
“effects of welfare receipt on union formation and dissolution” to be “small,” 
but “not zero.”81 She contends that “when considered in conjunction with other 
factors – such as the decline in low-skilled men’s earnings and the reduction in 
men’s willingness to support children – the effects of welfare are likely to be 
even larger.”82 
McLanahan sums up the change that began in the 1960s thus: “[D]ifferent 
forces were driving the behavior of women in the top and the bottom strata.”83 
For women in the upper strata, “feminism was providing a new identity, 
advances in birth control technology were providing the capacity, and 
increases in economic opportunities were providing the incentives to delay 
marriage and childbearing and to invest in careers.”84 By contrast, for women 
in the bottom strata, “[t]he promise of a new identity and the new birth control 
technologies . . . were of much less value,” since such women “had little 
incentive to delay motherhood and pursue a career.”85 As for marriage, 
“changes in the labor market conditions of low-skilled men were making the 
potential partners of these women less ‘marriageable,’ while changes in norms, 
bargaining power, and welfare benefits were making it easier for men to shirk 
their fatherhood responsibilities.”86 
Is the increase in single motherhood due more, then, to “women’s 
unwillingness to commit to low-skilled men” or “to men’s unwillingness to 
commit to women and children”?87 McLanahan explains that while we cannot 
yet answer that question, we do know two pertinent things. First, “the second 
demographic transition changed both the set of opportunities that men and 
women face and the balance of power between them.” Second, “men and 
women with the most education and the most resources appear to have 
established a new equilibrium that is based on more-equal gender roles.”88 
The urgent aims of McLanahan’s article are to explain why we should care 
about these demographic trends and the “growing disparities in children’s 
resources” and to make a case for the government to do something to 
“ameliorate” the impact of these changes.89 Some of the changes about which 
she worries concern adults, but many concern children. Focusing on adults, she 
points out that “inequality may lead to social isolation,” so that the 
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81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 619. 
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concentration of marriage among “high-income groups” may make “couples in 
the bottom part of the distribution . . . come to see it as less attainable for them, 
thus losing whatever benefits are associated with this universal institution.”90 
McLanahan relates this possibility to the extensive research done by the 
Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, which finds that one reason given 
by unmarried parents for not marrying is that “they are waiting until they can 
achieve a certain lifestyle that they associate with marriage.”91 In the words of 
one unmarried father, “‘I want to get my little house in Long Island, you know, 
white-picket fence, and two car garage, me hitting the garbage cans when I pull 
up in the driveway. You know . . . stuff like you see on TV.’”92 The problem is 
that this level of economic security may be unrealistic.  
 Marriage, Andrew Cherlin has argued, has become a “marker of prestige,” 
such that “the purchase of a home, and the acquisition of other accoutrements 
of married life” allow the couple “to display their attainment of a prestigious, 
comfortable, stable style of life.”93 In other work, McLanahan, with Kathryn 
Edin and Christina Gibson-Davis, documents the “mismatch between 
unmarried parents’ aspirations, expectations [for marriage] and their behavior,” 
again using the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study data.94 The 
“retreat from marriage,” they report, coexists with a high level of voiced 
support for “marriage as an institution.”95 This work confirms the view that 
“financial stability is by far the most common concern” mentioned and “is a 
necessary, though not sufficient, precondition for marriage for nearly all the 
couples [on whom the study provided data].”96 Financial concerns, however, 
include not simply “financial stability or responsibility,” but also building up 
savings and attaining typical markers of a middle-class life, such as “a house, a 
car, and other goods.”97 Assets are a “visible demonstration that the [couple] 
can engage in long-term financial planning” and also “offer release from 
financial worry,” which some unmarried parents believe “can lead to a level of 
tension and strife” that can threaten marital stability.98 Most couples also want 
to wait until they can “have a ‘decent’ wedding,” which, since they will be 
 
90 Id. 
91 Id. (citing Sara McLanahan et al., Unwed Parents or Fragile Families?, in OUT OF 
WEDLOCK: TRENDS, CAUSES, AND CONSEQUENCES OF NONMARITAL FERTILITY 202 
(Lawrence L. Wu & Barbara Wolfe eds., 2001)). 
92 Id. (quoting Christina Gibson et al., High Hopes but Even Higher Expectations: The 
Retreat from Marriage Among Low-Income Couples (Ctr. for Research on Child Wellbeing, 
Princeton University, Working Paper No. 2003-06-FF, 2004)). 
93 Andrew J. Cherlin, The Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage, 66 J. MARRIAGE 
& FAM. 848, 855, 857 (2004). 
94 Gibson-Davis et al., supra note 43, at 1302. 
95 Id.  
96 Id. at 1307. There are also important relationship quality concerns, discussed below. 
97 Id. at 1307-08. 
98 Id. 
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paying for it themselves, “requires extensive financial planning.”99 McLanahan 
and her colleagues conclude: “Though these expectations may seem 
impractical, we believe that they reflect the idea among low-income parents 
that getting married should signal that the couple has ‘arrived’ in a financial 
sense.”100 
This research suggests that people assess their marriageability based on an 
economic standard they see in the broader society. McLanahan and her 
colleagues have developed an “identity model of marriage,” which posits that 
marriage is associated with a set of norms about behaviors and living 
standards, and “the psychological gains to marriage depend on how closely 
people are able to match these ideals.”101 They show, using census data, that 
“when individual income is held constant, the further men fall below the 
median income of other men in their communities, the less likely they are to 
marry.”102 
McLanahan also argues that “we should be concerned about the high 
prevalence of single mothers, especially among mothers in the lower social 
strata.”103 On the one hand, “some single motherhood is probably a good sign 
for society,” because it indicates women “have the freedom to opt out of bad 
relationships.”104 On the other hand, “high levels of father absence are likely to 
be a sign of social disorganization and isolation.”105 McLanahan points out that 
single motherhood is associated with much higher poverty rates for children, 
and is also a “proxy for multiple risk factors that do not bode well for 
children.”106 Some of these risk factors pertain to the mothers themselves, such 
as higher rates of clinical depression and drug and tobacco use during 
pregnancy.107 Others factors relate to the fathers of these children, and include 
“higher rates of substance abuse, disability, domestic violence, and 
incarceration.”108 Unmarried parents have relationships that are “more complex 
and less stable” than those of married parents, and their households “are more 
likely to include children from other partnerships.”109 Unmarried-parent 
families have higher poverty and unemployment rates. Further, there are 
parenting-quality issues that are more prevalent among unmarried parents: 
“[b]reast-feeding and language stimulation are less common, whereas harsh 
 
99 Id. at 1308. 
100 Id. 
101 McLanahan, supra note 7, at 620. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 620-21. 
107 Id. at 621. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 621-22. 
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parenting is more common.”110 McLanahan concludes that although it is not 
possible to say “whether these marital-status differences are due to marriage 
per se or to something about the parents who marry, there are theoretical 
reasons for believing that father absence and high levels of union instability are 
harmful to children.”111 
If this is the problem, then what is the solution? McLanahan calls for 
government to take an active role.112 She analogizes to the New Deal-era 
creation of old age pensions “to address the increases in longevity that resulted 
from the first demographic transition,” and observes that “most countries are 
now creating institutions to deal with changes brought about by the second 
transition.”113 Some policies she proposes would seek to shape the behavior of 
adult men and women, while others would ameliorate the impact of 
demographic changes on children’s “diverging destinies.”114 For example, she 
asks, “what policies may encourage mothers and fathers in the lowest quartile 
to adopt the behaviors of parents in the top quartile?”115 In the case of “women 
from disadvantaged backgrounds,” that desired behavior is to “delay 
childbearing, invest in education and training, and form stable partnerships.”116 
For “men from disadvantaged backgrounds,” the aim is to get them “to remain 
committed to their children.”117 She proposes economic policies to “make it 
possible for men and women in the bottom strata to achieve the living standard 
they associate with marriage.”118 Those policies include the Earned Income 
Tax Credit, as well as “subsidized child care and preschools” that will “make 
work more rewarding” and also “directly increase[] children’s resources.”119 
The United States is a comparative laggard, it seems, in developing educational 
institutions.120 
To address developments in contraception and abortion rights, which have 
“undermined men’s willingness to take responsibility for their children,” 
McLanahan eschews shotgun weddings but insists upon policies, such as child 
 
110 Id. at 622. On class differences and language stimulation, see Tina Rosenberg, Op-
Ed., The Power of Talking to Your Baby, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2013, 3:25 PM), available at 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/10/the-power-of-talking-to-your-baby/?_r=0 
(“A poor child is likely to hear millions fewer words at home than a child from a 
professional family. And the disparity matters.”). 
111 McLanahan, supra note 7, at 622. 
112 Id. at 622-23. 
113 Id. at 622. 
114 Id. at 622-23. 
115 Id. at 622. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
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support enforcement, that “hold men responsible for the children they sire,”121 
while also, evidently, reducing nonmarital fertility.122 She also urges reforms to 
the “marriage penalty” in welfare and income-support policies, so that these 
policies do not “discourage work and marriage.”123 
Finally, McLanahan urges policymakers to learn some lessons from 
feminism.124 She observes that the federal government already spends money 
on a marriage initiative, which aims, among other things, “to improve 
communication skills within couples and to improve mutual understanding and 
trust.”125 While these programs have their skeptics, McLanahan points out that 
“the goal of ‘building mutual understanding and trust’ is consistent with the 
new marital standards envisioned by feminism.”126 The Fragile Families and 
Child Wellbeing Study’s qualitative research indicates that “disputes over 
sexual infidelity and gender mistrust are serious issues for many low-income 
couples,” and other research bears out these findings.127 Addressing these 
concerns, McLanahan points out that “marriage-promotion programs . . . may 
increase union stability among some low-income parents.”128 
McLanahan reiterates her opening thesis in closing: “[M]others with the 
most economic independence are leading the way, not in single motherhood, 
but in establishing stable unions that are based on a more equal sharing of 
parental responsibilities.”129 Further, she argues that government should play 
an “important role” in “ensuring that children have adequate resources in the 
new world that is being created by the demographic changes in family 
behavior” because “children deserve no less” than what government did for the 
elderly in the first transition.130 
B. The Other Marriage Equality Problem and Reauthorizing TANF: 
Remember When? 
The Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, for which McLanahan has 
been a principal investigator, follows a cohort of several thousand children 
born in large U.S. cities between 1998 and 2000; the study uses the term 
“fragile families” to reflect that three-fourths of such children were born to 
 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 622-23. 
124 Id. at 623. 
125 Id. McLanahan refers to the Healthy Marriage Initiative started in 2002 by the Bush 
Administration. Subsequently, in 2005, Congress established an annual funding stream to 
promote healthy marriage and responsible fatherhood. For further discussion of these 
programs, see infra notes 145-47 and accompanying text. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. (citing Cherlin, supra note 93, at 855-56). 
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129 Id. 
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unmarried parents and that those families are “at greater risk of breaking up 
and living in poverty than more traditional families.”131 The study focuses on 
child outcomes, as well as on the parents themselves, including the 
“capabilities and conditions” of the unmarried parents (especially the fathers) 
and the relationship between the unmarried parents.132 Why such parents do 
not marry has riveted the attention of scholars and lawmakers. Thus, DeParle’s 
news story about two forms of motherhood and the marital divide133 echoes 
debates in Congress a decade or more ago over the reauthorization of the 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program, a part of the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) 
originally enacted in 1996. Drawing on the Fragile Families and Child 
Wellbeing Study, members of Congress seized on the notion of a “magic 
moment,” the birth of a child, when eighty percent of the unmarried parents 
studied were romantically involved and a majority expressed an intention to 
marry.134 Lawmakers reasoned that policy interventions should seize on that 
magic moment and help those parents follow through on their good 
intentions.135 Alas, the Fragile Families researchers found that, despite 
unmarried parents’ high intentions, few couples actually married.136 
Another sociological finding that members of Congress found encouraging 
during the TANF reauthorization debates was that low-income mothers held 
the institution of marriage in high regard.137 Indeed, far from rejecting 
marriage as obsolete, these mothers held it in high esteem and did not wish to 
marry until they had what they considered the prerequisites for a successful 
marriage.138 In an influential article and subsequent book, Kathryn Edin 
(another Fragile Families researcher) identified both economic obstacles to 
marriage, such as the conviction that a couple should have a secure economic 
footing before marrying, and relationship quality concerns, such as distrust of 
men and concern over control.139 “Most mothers,” Edin told Congress, “want a 
partnership of equals.”140 In a memorable turn of phrase, she reported women’s 
 
131 See About the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, supra note 43.  
132 Id. 
133 DeParle, supra note 1. 
134 I discuss congressional interest in the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study in 
MCCLAIN, supra note 21, at 123. 
135 Id. 
136 See Gibson-Davis et al., supra note 43, at 1302 (describing the mismatch between 
unmarried parents’ aspirations, expectations, and behavior). 
137 MCCLAIN, supra note 21, at 122-23. 
138 Gibson-Davis et al., supra note 43, at 1307. 
139 See Kathryn Edin, Few Good Men, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 19, 2001), 
www.prospect.org/article/few-good-men; see also KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS, 
PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR WOMEN PUT MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE 9 (2005). 
140 MCCLAIN, supra note 21, at 117 (quoting Hearing on Welfare and Marriage Issues 
Before the Subcomm. On Human Res. of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. 82 
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view that “‘[a] man gets married to have somebody take care of them ‘cause 
their mommy can’t do it anymore.’”141 Edin observed that “[m]ost mothers 
don’t want to be owned or slave for their husband.”142 Edin’s testimony reports 
the same relationship-quality concerns found by McLanahan and other Fragile 
Families researchers. 
During the TANF reauthorization debates, lawmakers focused intensely on 
promoting “healthy marriage” and “responsible fatherhood.” Marriage 
promotion was also a cornerstone in President George W. Bush’s welfare 
reauthorization proposals.143 Lawmakers argued that welfare reform had been a 
success in moving mothers “from welfare to work,” but less successful in 
achieving its family-formation goals, such as reinforcing the concept that 
marriage is the proper setting in which to have children and that the two-
parent, mother-father marital family is both the best guarantor of child 
wellbeing and a potent anti-poverty device.144 Lawmakers pondered: How 
could public policy make men more “marriageable”? Might relationship and 
marriage education help? Training in parenthood skills? Household financial 
management? And, of course, what about investment in men’s human capital, 
such as through education and job training? All of these solutions were 
features in the various “responsible fatherhood” initiatives proposed over the 
years and in the ultimate legislation, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA), 
which authorized grants to governmental and nongovernmental groups to 
promote healthy marriage and responsible fatherhood.145 Even prior to the 
DRA, the Department of Health and Human Services’ Administration for 
Children and Families had launched a “Healthy Marriage Initiative.”146 The 
DRA also established the Healthy Marriage and Responsible Fatherhood 
Program and funded the still-ongoing National Healthy Marriage Resource 
 
(2001) (statement of Kathryn Edin, Associate Professor of Sociology, Institute of Policy 
Research, Northwestern University) [hereinafter Edin Statement]). 
141 Id. (quoting Edin Statement, supra note 140, at 82). 
142 Id. (quoting Edin Statement, supra note 140, at 82). 
143 See, e.g., Working Toward Independence: Promote Child Well-Being and Healthy 
Marriages, WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 2002), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/re 
leases/2002/02/welfare-book-05.html.  
144 See MCCLAIN, supra note 21, at 121-34. See generally Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 101, 110 Stat. 2015, 
2110-12 (stating findings in support of PRWORA’s passage and its family formation 
purposes). 
145 Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 7103, 120 Stat. 4, 138-40 
(2006). For discussion of various “responsible fatherhood” initiatives undertaken by states, 
as well as bills proposed in Congress, see MCCLAIN, supra note 21, at 121-26.  
146 Strengthening Families, Healthy Marriage and Responsible Fatherhood, U.S. DEP’T 
HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/opre/research/topic/overview/ 
strengthening-families-healthy-marriage-responsible-fatherhood (last visited May 12, 2013) 
(compiling studies undertaken as part of this initiative). 
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Center and National Responsible Fatherhood Clearinghouse websites.147 In 
2010 new federal legislation continued such funding.148 
I revisit the reauthorization debates and the launching of the federal 
government’s marriage initiatives to suggest both the persistence of concerns 
over the separation of parenthood from marriage and the new direction those 
concerns are taking in focusing on the conduct of the middle class. Back when 
the Clinton Administration and federal lawmakers defended PRWORA as an 
opportunity to “end welfare as we know it,” the focus was on closing the 
evident divide between the middle class, a group that “played by the rules” 
concerning family formation, and the welfare poor, who were allegedly out of 
touch with “fundamental [American] values of work, responsibility, and 
family.”149 In the reauthorization debates, armed with evidence that low-
income parents, in fact, did value marriage, lawmakers touted healthy marriage 
and responsible fatherhood as a way to close the gap between low-income 
women and men’s marital aspirations and practices, making available to them, 
for example, the same marriage education available to middle-class couples.150 
In striking contrast to those earlier efforts, contemporary warnings about the 
marriage divide focus on the growing gap between the middle class – or 
“Middle America” – and the most advantaged Americans. 
The emphasis in the PRWORA and TANF reauthorization debates on 
“personal responsibility,” as well as on the interplay of behavioral and 
structural factors in explaining poverty and patterns of family formation, has 
resonance for contemporary diagnoses of the “end of men” and of the marriage 
divide. One important feature of those debates was the concern that the intense 
focus on moving mothers from welfare to work – from dependence to 
independence – was leaving poor men behind.151 What should “personal 
responsibility” mean as applied to men, not only to women?152 Certainly, 
 
147 NAT’L HEALTHY MARRIAGE RESOURCE CENTER, http://www.healthymarriageinfo.org 
(last visited May 12, 2013); NAT’L RESPONSIBLE FATHERHOOD CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www 
.fatherhood.gov (last visited May 12, 2013).  
148 See Claims Resolution Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-291, § 811(b), 124 Stat. 3064, 
3159. 
149 See Presidential Statement on Signing the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1487, 1488 (Aug. 
22, 1996); McClain, supra note 11, at 352-57, 374-85 (discussing examples of this rhetoric 
in the PRWORA debates and in defenses of the “family cap”). 
150 MCCLAIN, supra note 21, at 121-34; McClain, supra note 11, at 415-16 (analyzing the 
use of personal responsibility arguments in 1990s welfare reform debates, including the idea 
that poor people on welfare should “play by the rules” in the same way that that working 
Americans purportedly did). 
151 See MCCLAIN, supra note 21, at 121-34. In this Symposium, Professor Khiara Bridges 
points out the pertinent ways in which black men had already “ended” prior to TANF’s 
reauthorization. Khiara M. Bridges, TANF and the End (Maybe?) of Poor Men, 93 B.U. L. 
REV. 1141, 1144-47 (2013). 
152 See Dorit Geva, Not Just Maternalism: Marriage and Fatherhood in American 
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Congress interpreted fathers’ personal responsibility to entail financial support, 
and it called for getting tough on “deadbeat dads” by expanding efforts to 
establish paternity and collect child support.153 But what if dads faced 
economic and other structural barriers that made taking “personal 
responsibility” difficult? Did the government have any obligation to help? The 
Clinton Administration spoke about the problems of “dead-broke” dads,154 and 
the keen interest in responsible-fatherhood initiatives dates back to that 
administration.155 Those initiatives, it warrants mention, also included 
noneconomic aspects of parenthood in defining “responsible fatherhood,” such 
as active involvement by a father in his child’s life. During his time in the U.S. 
Senate, Barack Obama sponsored responsible fatherhood legislation; as 
President, he has promoted responsible fatherhood as “every father taking 
responsibility for his child’s intellectual, emotional, and financial well-
being.”156 For example responsible-fatherhood campaigns launched under the 
Obama Administration promote active parenting, urging men to “take time to 
be a dad today.”157 The meaning of responsible fatherhood is also at issue in 
contemporary discussions of the marriage divide. As I shall discuss below, 
Rosin and Murray both offer evidence of a gender gap when it comes to the 
exercise of personal responsibility by those who are not among the marriage 
elite. Both also return us to perennial debates about the interplay of personal 
and public responsibility. 
Another interplay that holds contemporary relevance is the one that runs 
between economics and culture. In the 1990s some Republican welfare critics 
memorably drew a connection between “intergenerational poverty” and a 
“poverty of values.”158 Christina Gibson-Davis, Kathryn Edin, and Sara 
McLanahan consider the role of “culture” as one explanation for the reasons 
that unmarried parents separate marriage and parenthood: 
[W]hat the parents in our study did not say about marriage is worth 
noting. Couples rarely referred to their children when discussing 
marriage, and none believed that having a child was a sufficient 
 
Welfare Policy, 18 SOC. POL.: INT’L STUD. GENDER ST. & SOC’Y 24, 40-42 (2011). 
153 Id. at 40. This push for stricter laws also had implications for mothers, who must 
cooperate with such efforts in order to receive TANF benefits. 
154 See, e.g., President William J. Clinton, The President’s Radio Address (June 17, 
2000) (transcript available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=58649). 
155 See Geva, supra note 152, at 37. 
156 See Responsible Fatherhood and Healthy Families Act of 2009, S. 1309, 111th Cong. 
(2009); THE WHITE HOUSE, PROMOTING RESPONSIBLE FATHERHOOD (2012), available at http 
://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/fatherhood_report_6.13.12_final.pdf.  
157 For examples of such campaigns, see NAT’L RESPONSIBLE FATHERHOOD 
CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 147. 
158 See McClain, supra note 11, at 347-52 (citing remarks by Vice President Dan Quayle 
in After the Riots; Excerpts from Vice President’s Speech on Cities and Poverty, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 20, 1992, at A20). 
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motivation for marriage. Furthermore, no parent talked about marriage 
enhancing the life chances of their child. One possible explanation for 
this omission is that couples with these beliefs marry before giving birth 
to a child and are thus not in our unmarried sample. More likely, the 
parents in our sample did not discuss children vis-à-vis marriage because 
they see childrearing and marriage as separate decisions that no longer 
necessarily go together. The expectations that couples have of marriage – 
financial stability and a relatively high degree of relational quality – apply 
only to matrimony, not to parenthood.159 
The authors point out that researchers have previously suggested that the 
“separation between fertility and matrimony” among “low-income African 
Americans” may be a “rational response to their constrained circumstances.”160 
They posit an “alternative explanation that unmarried couples with children 
have become the norm,” such that “everyday experiences reinforce the idea 
that marriage is a singular event with its own high expectations.”161 What light 
do they shed on the puzzle of why the retreat from marriage does not bring a 
retreat from parenthood? The retreat from marriage, they conclude, seems to 
rest on a “cultural explanation”: as “the bar for marriage has grown higher for 
all Americans,” those in the “lower portion of the income distribution” find it 
increasingly difficult to “meet the standards associated with marriage.”162 At 
the same time, low-income couples “defer marriage while continuing to bear 
children” because of “other shifts in the American ethos, especially the view 
that marriage is no longer the only appropriate venue for childrearing.”163 
Thus, by titling their influential book Promises I Can Keep: Why Poor Women 
Put Motherhood Before Marriage, Edin and Kefalas highlighted the 
comparatively higher degree of confidence low-income women have in their 
capacity to be good mothers than in their capacity to form successful marriages 
with their child’s father.164 
As I will now discuss, the Pew Research Center’s study bears out this shift 
in the American ethos about marriage and childbearing, even as that ethos is in 
tension with views about what type of household setting is best for children. 
C. The Decline of Marriage: “Who Needs Marriage?” vs. a Class-Based 
Marriage Divide 
Since the commencement of the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing 
Study, which examined low-income parents, more recent surveys and studies 
document the decline of marriage among the middle class and among those 
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with some college education but not a college degree. The decline of marriage 
has enjoyed prominent news coverage and is also a central theme of Murray’s 
book, which I discuss in Part IV. Rather than simply a rich-poor divide, these 
studies describe the marriage gap as a growing divide between a small group of 
marriage “haves” and a much larger group of marriage “have nots.” At the 
same time, these studies also raise the “Who needs marriage?” question in a 
way that suggests that people do not marry as a matter of choice, not because 
they view marriage as out of reach. Moreover, the decline in marriage rates 
seen among moderately educated middle-class couples is occurring at the same 
time as an observable separation of marriage from parenthood among members 
of the middle class. Reminiscent of the shifting “ethos” McLanahan and her 
co-authors observed concerning whether marriage and parenthood still go 
together, these studies also find that public opinion does not view marriage as 
the only way to form a family or the only setting in which to parent. 
1. Marriage as a “Shrinking Institution”165: Obsolete or Out of Reach? 
In November 2010 the Pew Research Center, in conjunction with TIME, 
released a highly publicized report, The Decline of Marriage and Rise of New 
Families.166 One basic message was that marriage is a “shrinking institution”: 
marriage is no longer the “pre-eminent family unit” that it was during the mid-
twentieth century.167 Rather, “[a] variety of new arrangements have emerged, 
giving rise to a broader and evolving definition of what constitutes a 
family.”168 The report observes that “[m]arriage is no longer considered a 
prerequisite for parenthood.”169 As I have elaborated elsewhere, this report 
shows both public recognition of family diversity and sharp public division 
about how to evaluate such diversity.170 Notably, a large majority views the 
increase in single mothers raising children without paternal involvement in the 
child’s life as a “bad thing for society.”171 A smaller majority of young people 
hold this view.172 The report shows lower levels of public concern over a same-
sex couple raising children, perhaps suggesting the strength of the belief that a 
child should have two parents.173 With respect to the link between marriage 
and parenthood, the report shows some findings that seem to be in tension with 
each other. For example, a majority of Americans do not view “having 
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children” as the most important reason to marry; only 59% of married people 
and 44% of unmarried people considered it a “very important” reason to marry, 
well behind love, making a lifelong commitment, and companionship.174 A 
majority, however, agree with the statement that “a child needs a home with 
both a mother and a father to grow up happily.”175 Within this majority, 
however, there is a notable generational difference: only 53% of young people 
agreed with the statement as compared to 75% of respondents over sixty-
five.176 
Considering the class-based marriage equality problem, the report finds that 
“a marriage gap and a socio-economic gap have been growing side by side for 
the past half century, and each may be feeding off the other.”177 The report 
finds that “[m]arriage rates are now more strongly linked to education than 
they have been in the past, with college graduates (64%) much more likely to 
be married than those who have never attended college (48%).”178 The report 
finds even larger racial differences; for instance, the marriage gap between 
blacks and whites has “increased significantly over time,” so that “[b]lacks 
(32%) are much less likely than whites (56%) to be married.”179 Moreover, 
“black children (52%) are nearly three times as likely as white children (18%) 
and nearly twice as likely as Hispanic children (27%) to live with one 
parent.”180 Echoing the findings of McLanahan and other family researchers, 
the report notes a gap between marital aspirations and practice, attributable to a 
perceived economic bar to marriage: “adults on the lower rungs of the socio-
economic ladder (whether measured by income or education) are just as eager 
as other adults to marry,” but “they place a higher premium on economic 
security as a prerequisite for marriage than do those with higher levels of 
income and education.”181 “[T]his is a bar that they – and their pool of 
prospective spouses – may find increasingly difficult to meet, given the fact 
that, relative to other groups, they have experienced significant economic 
declines in recent decades.”182 Generational differences are also contributing to 
the decline of marriage, as younger adults are “delaying marriage and entering 
into less-traditional family arrangements.”183 This trend allows the report to tell 
two demographic stories simultaneously: a story about marriage “haves” and 
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“have nots” as well as a story about how marriage is, or at least may be 
becoming, obsolete. 
The report notes the relevance of socioeconomic status to marriage and the 
divergence in the family lives of those with and without a college education (a 
theme also pursued at length by Murray and in the State of Our Unions 
reports). The report observes: “2007 marked the first time that college-
educated young adults were more likely than those without a college degree to 
have married by the age of 30.”184 Indeed, “college graduates are now much 
more likely than those without a college degree to live in a traditional, 1950s-
style family.”185 By “traditional,” the report seems to mean living in a 
household with spouse and children, not the particular gendered division of 
labor in a 1950s household.186 As the report’s accompanying TIME story, Who 
Needs Marriage? A Changing Institution, authored by Belinda Lusbcombe, 
emphasizes (using the marriage of Prince William and Kate Middleton as an 
example), the trend in marriage is toward assortative mating: people 
increasingly marry later and marry partners “on the same socioeconomic and 
educational level.”187 This change is due, in significant part, to women’s 
advances in education and in the economy, since “it’s more likely than it used 
to be that a male college graduate will meet, fall in love with, wed and share 
the salary of a woman with a degree.”188 
The trend toward assortative marriage relates to the emerging template of 
the egalitarian marriage as the best form of marriage. The Pew report notes that 
“more than six-in-ten (62%) now say that the best kind of marriage is one 
where the husband and wife both work and both take care of the household and 
children. In 1977, fewer than half (48%) endorsed this egalitarian template for 
spousal roles.”189 Parallel data show changes in wives’ roles: wives comprised 
32% of the workforce in 1960 and comprise 61% of the workforce now.190 
What the public believes to be desirable qualities in a spouse are highly similar 
for a husband and a wife, another sign of an emerging egalitarian template.191 
Nonetheless, some of the report’s findings suggest either the residual hold of 
gender conventions or public ambivalence about gender roles. For example, a 
strong majority (67%) of respondents believe that a man should “be able to 
support a family financially in order to be ready for marriage,” while “only 
33% say this is [a] very important” factor for assessing a woman’s readiness.192 
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The Pew report interprets this data as showing “the public’s ambivalence about 
changing gender roles over the past half century.”193 For example, most 
Americans embrace the changing role of women in society, with only 19% 
saying women should return to their traditional roles in society.194 At the same 
time, 71% also proclaim they “have old-fashioned values about family and 
marriage.”195 As noted above, one example of these old-fashioned values 
seems to be the solid majority of those surveyed who believe that “single 
women having children” is a “bad thing for society.”196 
One message in Luscombe’s article is that “the kids may not be all right.”197 
The author declares that, “[r]arely is there a bigger chasm between what 
Americans believe to be the best things for society and what actually happens 
than in the bearing and raising of children.”198 The public views marital status 
as “irrelevant to achieving respect, happiness, career goals, financial security 
or a fulfilling sex life,” but believes that raising kids is “best done married,” 
even though “few people say children are the most important reason” to get 
married.199 The article reports findings from the Fragile Families and Child 
Wellbeing Study concerning the gap between marital expectations and practice 
and emphasizing the likelihood that children born to unmarried mothers would 
experience their mother living with a new partner.200 
Luscombe concludes that, “[i]t seems that the 21st century marriage, with its 
emphasis on a match of equals, has brought about a surge in inequality.”201 The 
causal relationships between the burdens of poverty and the impermanence of 
relationships are not clear, and so neither is the solution.202 The article asks 
whether marriage, “which used to be like the draft,” is “now becoming more 
like West Point, admitting only the elite and sending the others off to the front 
line.”203 Marriage-education experts urge bolstering marriage and teaching 
communication skills, while “[s]ociologists tend to believe the answers lie 
outside marriage,” such as through fostering higher societal expectations 
concerning alternative family arrangements and expecting “‘responsible 
behavior outside as well as inside marriage.’”204 Curiously, given the identified 
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socioeconomic gap between married and unmarried couples,205 the story offers 
no recommendations for economic policy. 
2. The Fragile Middle, or Middle America’s “Retreat” from Marriage 
The State of Our Unions 2012 report, issued by The National Marriage 
Project at the University of Virginia and the Institute for American Values, is 
titled The President’s Marriage Agenda for the Forgotten Sixty Percent.206 
Who is included in this sixty percent, and how are they forgotten? The report’s 
thesis is that “[i]n ‘Middle America,’ defined here as the nearly 60 percent of 
Americans aged 25 to 60 who have a high school but not a four-year college 
degree, marriage is rapidly slipping away.”207 This is “astonishing” and 
worrying because, as Barbara Dafoe Whitehead states, “‘[f]our decades ago, 
these moderately educated Americans led the kind of family lives that looked 
much like the family lives of the more highly educated. They were just as 
likely to be happily married, and just as likely to be in first marriages.’”208 Like 
the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, this report also identifies a 
mismatch between marital expectations and behavior. It speaks of the “plight” 
of “this population who once married in high proportions and formed families 
within marriage – and who still aspire to marriage but increasingly are unable 
to achieve it” as “the social challenge for our times.”209 
The link between fragile families and middle-class families is further 
evidenced by the report’s reiteration of an observation from an earlier State of 
Our Unions report, which warned of “the retreat from marriage in Middle 
America.”210 The earlier report, When Marriage Disappears: The New Middle 
America, found that, as marriage among the “moderately-educated middle 
begins to resemble the fragile state of marriage among the poor, the family 
patterns of the high school educated become ‘more likely to resemble those of 
high school dropouts, with all the attendant problems of economic stress, 
partner conflict, single parenting, and troubled children.’”211 Another parallel 
between fragile families and middle-class families is the increasing willingness 
of Middle Americans to separate marriage from parenthood: “Middle 
America’s couples express reservations about marriage but still want, and are 
having, children.”212 The 2012 report expresses concerns about the impact on 
“children of Middle America,” who are “growing up without stable families to 
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help them weather economic change, deregulation, and globalization” and who 
also suffer “[t]he loss of social opportunity,” with attendant costs for 
taxpayers.213 The report worries about the instability of cohabitation as 
compared to marriage, and, quoting Andrew Cherlin, expresses concern about 
Americans “stepping ‘on and off the carousel of intimate relationships’ 
increasingly rapidly.”214 This marriage decline leads to “a society of winners 
and losers,” with implications for the next generation: children of “married, 
well-educated parents are increasingly likely to have the same advantages 
when they become adults, graduating from four-year colleges and establishing 
marriages that are, on average, more stable and of better quality than in the 
recent past.”215 In effect, social reproduction among the married will include 
the reproduction of advantage while social reproduction in Middle America 
will “increasingly” reproduce disadvantage: “[T]hose born to fragmented 
families are increasingly likely to repeat their parents’ patterns and to 
experience the heartache, hardship, and risks that result.”216 
What factors does the State of Our Unions 2012 report believe contribute to 
this “rapid disappearance of marriage in Middle America”?217 The report 
references Murray’s Coming Apart as sparking a debate on the issue and 
summarizes his conclusion that “the greatest source of inequality in America is 
not economic but cultural, stemming from millions of Americans losing touch 
with founding virtues.”218 The report also observes that some policymakers, 
not focused directly on marriage, advocate greater investment in “family 
planning, job training, and post-secondary education,” in order to reduce levels 
of nonmarital births and increase rates of high school graduates going to 
college.219 My concern here is not to engage the “truth of the matter” in terms 
of what best explains the observed trends in marriage patterns, but rather to 
report the mix of cultural and economic approaches. The report does propose 
some concrete economic policies (similar to McLanahan’s proposals) aimed at 
improving “the culture of marriage in Middle America.”220 Strikingly, it 
references “[r]ecent popular analyses,” including Rosin’s, “suggest[ing] that 
we are seeing the ‘end of men’” and responds with measures to “help young 
men become marriageable men” by inspiring and equipping them “to be better 
husbands and fathers.”221 These measures include economic programs, such as 
apprenticeships, as well as more marriage-focused initiatives, such as 
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responding to the high rate of male incarceration by using the “resources of the 
criminal justice system to help intervene and offer relationship education and 
hope for a good marriage,” thereby increasing the odds of incarcerated young 
men “turning their lives around” and having a decent marriage.222 The report 
observes that “[m]ost of these young men will have children, whether we 
intervene or not.”223 This proposal responds directly to the concern that there is 
a shortage of marriageable African American men because so many have 
become caught up in the criminal justice system.224 The report also applauds 
ongoing efforts by the military to support healthy family relationships amid the 
stresses of military deployment and post-traumatic stress disorder.225 
There are many other components of the report’s proposed marriage agenda, 
many of which focus on relationship education sponsored by state and federal 
governments.226 Some, as the report’s title suggests, focus on cultural 
initiatives, such as using public service campaigns and statements by the 
President and Hollywood stars to “convey the truth about marriage, family 
stability, and child well-being to the next generation of parents.”227 Since this 
report is the first State of Our Unions report issued since Institute for American 
Values president David Blankenhorn announced his support for same-sex 
marriage, it warrants mention that the report states that, whether one is for, 
against, or uncertain about gay marriage, one can still talk about marriage.228 
Here, nonetheless, the focus is on heterosexuals: “Talk about gay marriage – 
and then talk about why marriage is important for the vast majority of people 
who identify as heterosexual and whose sexual lives quite often produce 
children. Why does marriage matter for those kids?”229 
The report does not directly engage issues of egalitarian models of marriage 
versus other models. The only mention of gender equality is the notion that if 
one supports women’s rights, one could talk about how “raising children in 
marriage is on average a much easier road for women and their families,” and 
that, if one is concerned about domestic violence, one should realize that there 
are far greater risks of such violence “with boyfriends and live-in partners than 
in marriage.”230 
The report closes by sounding a cry for recognizing the link between 
marriage and social reproduction; it calls on the president, other leaders, and 
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fellow citizens to “join us in supporting marriage as a vital pathway to opening 
social opportunity – for today’s young people, and their children.”231 
III. WHAT HAPPENS TO MARRIAGE WITH THE END OF MEN AND THE RISE OF 
WOMEN? 
Hanna Rosin’s book, The End of Men: And the Rise of Women, offers a 
window into both dimensions of the other marriage equality problem: the class 
divide and gender dynamics within and outside of marriage. Her book also 
highlights the tension evident in contrasting news stories about the future of 
marriage. On one account, marriage is a class privilege, where now not just the 
poor, but also the undereducated middle class, are left out. On another, 
marriage – and intimate relationships more broadly – are simply not on the 
agenda of an increasing number of people who live satisfying lives as “single 
by choice.”232 As a feminist scholar, I find intriguing Rosin’s exploration of 
the reasons that women across the class divide decide that marriage is not for 
them, or at least, not for them right now. 
A. Who Needs Marriage?: Avoiding “Derailment” from Relationships 
Rosin reports that one reason for marriage not being on the agenda for some 
highly ambitious and successful women is because they perceive that a 
relationship with a man will simply get in their way or even derail them.233 In 
her much-discussed chapter on the hookup culture, Rosin observes that 
“today’s college girl likens a serious suitor to an accidental pregnancy in the 
nineteenth century: a danger to be avoided at all costs, lest it thwart a 
promising future.”234 Rosin asserts that research shows that “women benefit 
greatly from living in a world where they can have sexual adventure without 
commitment or all that much shame, and where they can enter into temporary 
relationships that don’t derail their careers.”235 Rosin even asserts that 
“feminist progress is largely dependent on hook-up culture,” and that women 
perpetuate that culture because it serves their own ends, such as by allowing 
them to focus on school performance, employment, and their financial future 
instead of relationships.236 As these college graduates move on to become 
high-achieving career women, they learn to use their “erotic capital” 
strategically, since they “no longer need men for financial security and social 
influence.”237 Even when young women may be ready for marriage, one 
problem is that young men, for a variety of reasons, including immersion in 
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“universal frat boy culture,” are “no longer suitable for stable romantic 
relationships, especially relationships with ‘equal status female mates.’”238 
Nonetheless, Rosin ends the chapter on a happily-ever-after note: Sabrina, an 
ambitious business school graduate who had previously sought to root out any 
personal vulnerability and broke off several engagements, was now planning 
her wedding.239 
One criticism of Rosin is her inadequate analysis of less-privileged female 
college students.240 For such women, according to Rosin, an unsatisfactory 
marriage seems both inevitable and a trap to escape. Rosin reports that these 
women “came to college mostly with boyfriends back home and the 
expectation of living a life similar to their parents’: make it through school, 
start work immediately, and get married along the way.”241 They found the 
hookup culture “initially alienating” and felt “trapped between the choice of 
marrying a kind of hometown guy they called ‘the disaster’ – a man who never 
gets off the couch and steals their credit card – or joining a sexual culture that 
made them uncomfortable.”242 She then reports that such women came to see 
that “[s]uccess meant seeing the hook-up culture for what it is: a path out of a 
dead-end existence, free from a life yoked to the ‘disaster.’”243 She gives 
anecdotal evidence of the hookup culture opening up young women’s horizons 
so that they need not marry and settle down right away, like their peers back 
home.244 Sherry Linkon insightfully comments that Rosin paints the options 
these working-class women perceive as “two extremes” and leaves out the 
possibility of “plenty of open space and many options” between them, 
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“including the possibility that an educated woman from a working-class 
background could construct a fulfilling relationship with an uneducated man 
with whom she shares a home culture.”245 For example, this type of marriage is 
one that many black women form, given disparities in levels of education 
between black women and men.246 Instead, Rosin seems to view “marrying a 
working-class man” as “an inherently bad, even foolish choice.”247 Rosin also 
“glibly exaggerate[s] the tensions working-class women might feel with the 
‘classed self-development imperative’ of higher education.”248 
B. The Seesaw Marriage 
Rosin picks up the narrative thread in the next chapter with portraits of the 
“seesaw marriage.”249 This term refers to the allegedly egalitarian marriages 
formed by elites – well-educated people who have careers and balance work 
and family based on criteria other than the traditional male-
breadwinner/female-caregiver dichotomy. Or try to, anyway. How do things 
work in “seesaw marriages,” or what Rosin calls “true love (just for elites)”?250 
In theory, the “new model of elite marriage” is a “constantly shifting equation” 
in terms of who does what and whose career and personal needs take 
precedence at any one time: “sixty-forty or eighty-twenty or ninety-ten.”251 
The actual portraits in the chapter reveal, as Rosin puts it, “tensions under the 
surface.”252 Facing new roles as caregivers, men are experiencing “the old 
Betty Friedan identity crisis, only in masculine form.”253 Indeed, in Rosin’s 
stories, men are clearly struggling and are even “haunted by the specter of a 
coming gender apocalypse.”254 
The division of labor of some of the couples Rosin profiles suggests that the 
seesaw is tilted too far toward the woman assuming too many responsibilities 
and the man assuming too few. One example is Steven and Sarah Andrews, 
both in their thirties, whom Rosin describes as “consummate ‘marriage 
planners,’ the current reigning model among the professional class.”255 She 
works; he stays home and takes care of their child and is a self-described 
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“mediocre house dude,” committed just to keeping the house “mildly clean.”256 
Sarah, not surprisingly, feels that she actually is “in charge of both realms” – 
work and home – whirling into action at home after a long day at work, while 
Steven “feels entitled to check out on evenings and weekends.”257 This makes 
Sarah “‘tired and sometimes angry.’”258 
Despite all that Sarah does, Rosin reports that “there is a reigning notion in 
the Andrews house that Steven is ultimately the one in charge, that if anything 
ever went wrong, Steven would stand between his family and disaster.”259 
Sarah analogizes their situation to the television show Charlie’s Angels, with 
Steven as Charlie and Sarah doing his bidding: planner and executor.260 Rosin 
acknowledges, however, that “[t]his may be a fiction they both perpetuate 
because women have not yet become accustomed to owning the power even 
when it is so obviously theirs.”261 It may also be a way that men “preserve the 
protector aspect of being the breadwinner even when they are not earning the 
money,” or it may, or may not, be a way to “save men from obsolescence and 
give them space to invent an entirely new way of being a happy, harmonious 
family in the age of female power.”262 
If this is the portrait of an egalitarian marriage among the elite, it is rather 
disheartening. Further, Steven himself does not seem to think men are much 
good. Rosin concludes the chapter with their son Xavier taking off his diaper 
and “pee[ing] in the hallway for maybe the third time that day.”263 Steven 
philosophizes: “‘All boys do is pee on things. Nothing good comes from being 
a man. Women bring good things to the world. I live longer if I have a wife. I 
have a better, healthier life.’”264 In fact, Steven is correct that marriage does 
have health and other benefits, especially for men, because of what Linda 
Waite and Maggie Gallagher call the “virtues of [wifely] nagging.”265 Earlier 
in the chapter, Rosin reports research that “men need marriage more than 
women do”266 and that it benefits men more than women.267 Even more 
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striking is Steven’s statement about his son: “‘I wanted a little Anne of Green 
Gables. Someone creative and good. I would love it if the next one is a little 
girl. Like my wife. A superstar.’”268 Unlike Murray, Rosin does not pay 
attention to the social reproduction of advantage; that is, how people in seesaw 
marriages transmit advantage to their children. Her focus is more on how 
individual men are coping with changing roles and prefiguring “what marriage 
will look like in the not too distant future, when more women than men are 
paying the bills.”269 
C. The “New American Matriarchy” Among the Married . . . and Unmarried 
Rosin explores the other side of the class divide over marriage in her 
chapter, “The New American Matriarchy: The Middle Class Gets a Sex 
Change.”270 I augment my discussion with her New York Times Magazine 
cover story, Who Wears the Pants in This Economy?: When Jobs Go Away, 
Husbands and Wives Make a New Deal,271 timed to coincide with the release 
of her book. Together, the book and article focus on women and men dealing 
with “upended gender dynamics”272 in two types of relationships: (1) those of 
younger, generally unmarried, couples, in which striving middle-class women 
see unemployed and underemployed men as not adding much of value to their 
lives or even making their lives harder, and (2) marital relationships among 
older couples trying to adjust to a new division of labor triggered by male job 
loss in the recession. 
Startlingly, Rosin uses the term “matriarchy” in her book and cover story 
without making any historical reference to Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s widely 
discussed use of the term in his controversial 1965 report, The Negro Family: 
The Case for National Action.273 Instead, when she comments that the pattern 
of women “stepping into the traditional provider role” and declining to marry 
the fathers of their children “has played out once before in American culture,” 
her historical reference is to sociologist William Julius Wilson’s When Work 
Disappears.274 Wilson’s book described the decline of manufacturing jobs for 
black men, beginning in the 1970s, and the consequences for family life and 
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marriage.275 At the same time, by using the term “nascent middle-class 
matriarchy” to refer to gender dynamics among older, married, middle-class 
couples, Rosin extends the use of the term.276 
Beginning with the unmarried, younger couples, Rosin sketches profiles of 
working-class women struggling valiantly to better themselves, care for their 
children, and pursue the American dream, while the men in their lives seem to 
be a net drain. The opening pages of her book refer to Bethenny and Calvin, 
who have a ten-year-old daughter.277 When Rosin encounters Bethenny by 
chance in a supermarket and asks her if she wants to marry, Bethenny looks at 
her daughter, to whom she tosses a granola bar, and laughs: “Well, there’s 
Calvin . . . . But Calvin would just mean one less granola bar for the two of 
us.”278 Rosin interprets the laugh as an indicator of empowerment: far from 
being a “pitiable single mother,” Bethenny, “[b]y keeping Calvin at arm’s 
length [] could remain queen of her castle, and with one less mouth to feed,” 
she and her daughter “might both be better off.”279 
Women in Rosin’s portraits adapt and adjust to changing economic 
circumstances (hence, her term “Plastic Woman”); men, in contrast, remain 
stuck in the past, still hoping that the jobs of yesteryear will return (“Cardboard 
Man,” Rosin calls them, although something about being glued or stuck to the 
spot might be more apt).280 One critical difference between her account and 
that of Murray is that Rosin specifically focuses on such gender dynamics. 
Part of why men are stuck is due to their conception of proper gender roles. 
For example, one man profiled by Rosin, Troy, is fond of using the refrain, 
“‘ain’t a man.’”281 This phrase is used not only to express pride in his female 
partner, Shannon, but also to express what no man “would take [] from his 
wife,” such as coming home from work late without an explanation.282 When, 
for the fourth night, Shannon, who is the primary breadwinner and juggles 
working at Walmart and as an exotic dancer with going to nursing school, 
came home late, Troy “choked her until she passed out.”283 We are told that he 
regarded this as his “darkest hour” and Rosin reports, without editorializing, 
that “[t]o make it up to her, he bought her a choker with a really big silver 
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heart to cover the bruise.”284 Troy seems to contribute little to the household. 
He does, however, make their son laugh and manage to calm Shannon down.285 
Troy says they have a “Jerry Springer relationship” with a lot of fighting over 
“sex and work”: he complains about the infrequency of sex; Shannon 
complains that he “never brings home a paycheck.”286 Troy cannot get over the 
closing down of the Russell Athletic manufacturing plant. He “is living in his 
father’s memory of the great days of Russell.”287 Shannon urges Troy to “[g]et 
over it,” and stop living in the past.288 
Rosin concludes the chapter with Shannon, in yet another effort to help Troy 
move forward, driving him to the old site of the Russell factory, where a truck 
trailer is “sunk into the earth.”289 Displayed on the trailer is “an enormous 
painting of a football player in full uniform running with the ball tucked in his 
hands, next to the words RUSSELL. THE EXPERIENCE SHOWS.”290 Rosin 
sees this as “depressing,” a “mockery of imminent victory,” 291 and we assume 
Shannon does too. Troy, however, “doesn’t register that emotion.”292 Instead, 
he responds by jokingly assuming a football pose and tackles her to the 
ground, “where both of them fall, for the moment, laughing.”293 What happens 
next we are not told. 
A fascinating examination of gender dynamics and role negotiation within 
marriage is showcased in Rosin’s portraits of somewhat older, married couples 
in which the woman is now the primary earner and the man is newly under- or 
unemployed. These are the couples profiled in her New York Times Magazine 
cover story.294 The story begins with the teaser: “Welcome to the new middle-
class matriarchy.”295 Compared to Shannon and Troy, the couples featured in 
this story are more solidly middle class, but the husbands experienced a 
reversal of fortune in the recession and the wives became the primary 
breadwinners. Instead of engaging in violent choking followed by choker 
necklaces, these men look beaten down themselves. In the remarkable photos 
accompanying this story, the poses are of women putting their arms around 
their men. In two photos, the husbands sit in chairs while their wives stand 
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next to or behind them with an arm around their shoulder.296 In another, the 
husband stands with hands in his pockets while his wife holds onto his arm as 
if propping him up.297 
These couples cope with a gender ideology, often rooted in the teachings of 
their Christian religion, that the man is the head of the household and that an 
essential feature of manhood is providing for wife and family.298 Wives, 
according to this religious worldview, should graciously submit to their 
husbands.299 Murray, as I discuss below, also stresses “religiosity” as being 
among the founding virtues. “Like everyone of their generation I spoke to,” 
Rosin observes of one featured couple, “Charles and Sarah Beth Gettys both 
insisted that Charles was still the ‘head of the household.’”300 Charles, 
formerly head of national sales for the fabrics division of Russell, had left that 
job in 2003 when he saw his position would not last much longer, and then had 
a brief, unsuccessful foray into starting a construction business.301 Meanwhile, 
Sarah, who had always worked as a nurse, but only to earn “fun money” for the 
family, steadily rose up the ranks as her hospital employer grew, eventually 
becoming vice president in charge of patient services and the family’s primary 
breadwinner.302 
When Rosin pressed couples as to why men “got to retain their title if they 
weren’t fulfilling most of the attending duties,” some answered in terms of 
“redefining ‘head’ as ‘spiritual head,’ meaning biblically ordained as 
leader.”303 Further, men could be protectors and rescuers even if they weren’t 
primary earners, or earning at all: “[I]f someone broke into the house, if the 
children were in trouble or out of control, if the roof caved in, if there was a 
tornado, if we need him, he would rescue us.”304 Sarah Beth asks her Sunday 
school class of high school girls to reflect on “what being ‘submissive’ means 
in today’s world,” while another wife “sometimes used the word ‘submissive’ 
but usually put it in air quotes.”305 These portraits suggest that even if women 
“wear the pants,” they are still invested in helping men feel that they are the 
“leaders” of the family. 
These stories also indicate that in addition to structural obstacles traceable to 
the current recession, such as a loss of manufacturing jobs, men confront 
obstacles due to conceptions of masculinity that hinder their ability to adapt to 
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the new economy. Rosin captures this with her repeated imagery of men being 
stuck, a metaphor in sharp contrast with women’s plasticity and adaptability, 
including their ability to adapt to new gender roles. For example, why don’t 
men take advantage of opportunities to shift to the types of jobs for which 
there will be continuing demand in a post-industrial economy? In the New York 
Times Magazine story, one husband, Reuben, explains why he could not train 
for one of the jobs that he knew was available: “‘We’re in the South’ . . . . ‘A 
man needs a strong macho job. He’s not going to be a schoolteacher or a legal 
secretary or some beauty-shop queen. He’s got to be a man.’”306 Another, Rob, 
was struggling to get his network consultant business going after his position 
as a network analyst at Russell was phased out. His self-image is as the family 
provider and “the man of the house,” despite the fact that his wife Connie is 
providing the “dependable salary.”307 He explains that he has internalized the 
ideal of man as provider, adding: “It’s like, if I can’t take care of her, then I’m 
not a man.”308 Comic relief from this dilemma arrives in the form of comments 
by Connie’s daughter from her first marriage, who proclaims that Rob’s ideas 
about marriage are “so cute, it’s gross,” and finds “this Southern code of 
chivalry” to be “nonsense,” out of sync with how the “boys she knew actually 
behaved – hanging out in the parking lot, doing God knows what, or going 
home and playing video games instead of bothering to apply for college.”309 
In contrast to these older women, who often assumed primary breadwinner 
roles after their husbands experienced a reversal of fortune, many of the 
younger women Rosin profiles feel little obligation to shore up or bolster their 
male partner. Here Rosin’s portraits of male haplessness and irresponsibility 
are quite vivid. In a later chapter of her book, “Pharm Girls,” Rosin profiles 
Hannah, one of the growing number of women going to pharmacy school as a 
path to upward mobility.310 Hannah’s boyfriend is Billy, an underemployed 
painter who often goes fishing with his buddies, who “are also underworked 
this year.”311 Rosin captures Hannah’s exasperation with Billy and his apparent 
refusal to better himself. One telling example of their conflict is over television 
preferences: she favors documentaries and educational shows; he favors 
Comedy Central.312 The chapter ends with Billy turning the television to the 
movie Jackass 3D. Hannah “rolls her eyes because, she says, those jackasses 
do the same exact thing, year after year. ‘What’s wrong with that?’ says 
Billy.”313 What holds Billy back? Once again, Cardboard Man fails to adapt to 
new economic realities. While Hannah is emblematic of women who see the 
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value of professional training as a pathway to a lucrative profession, Billy is 
emblematic of men who do not pursue such education. Rosin attributes this 
failure by “Cardboard Man” in part to the problem that “the range of 
acceptable masculine roles has changed comparatively little,” and has even 
narrowed as men “shy away from some careers as women begin to dominate 
them.”314 
Rosin concludes the book on a somewhat hopeful note. Calvin, on whom 
Bethenny was reluctant to expend a granola bar, is enrolling in the nursing 
program Bethenny just completed, willing to give it a try “even though the 
classes looked like ‘all skirts’ to him.”315 Higher on the economic ladder 
herself, Rosin indicates that her research has led to personal reflection. She 
writes: “[It has] caused me to start raising my own two sons differently. Even 
if it’s against their ‘nature,’ I want to teach them to bend.”316 And she adds that 
“[t]o my relief, I’ve discovered that with a little creativity on all our parts, it’s 
not all that hard.”317 
In sum, Rosin’s book offers rich material on certain aspects of the other 
marriage equality problem. Missing from her analysis, however, is 
consideration of the impact of the so-called “new American matriarchy” for 
children, or the “reproduction of disadvantage” problem. As Naomi Cahn and 
June Carbone observe in their contribution to this Symposium, “[w]hile Rosin 
paints a cheery picture of single mothers preferring to make it on their own, 
their children are falling further behind the children in two-parent families 
whose combined resources offer greater advantages.”318 Moreover, Rosin does 
not attend much to the impact of the marriage divide on the capacity of 
neighborhoods and communities in which these comparatively disadvantaged 
families live to support social reproduction. 
IV. CHARLES MURRAY: THE MARRIAGE DIVIDE THREATENS AMERICAN 
EXCEPTIONALISM 
In his book, Coming Apart: The State of White America, 1960-2010, Murray 
worries a great deal about the implications of the marriage divide for social 
reproduction. He suggests certain demographic trends “call[] into question the 
viability of white working-class communities as a place for socializing the next 
generation.”319 He contends that American exceptionalism has rested in 
America’s community life: “The founding virtues operating under the 
freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution produced an American civic culture 
that was unique in all the world. . . . All observers [(among them Alexis de 
Tocqueville)] agreed that community life in the United States was unlike 
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community life anywhere else.”320 Murray identifies the four core values, or 
“founding virtues,” upon which America rests as marriage, industriousness, 
honesty, and religiosity.321 These virtues work together and their decline 
causes social capital to deteriorate: “The empirical relationships that exist 
among marriage, industriousness, honesty, religiosity, and a self-governing 
society mean that the damage is done, even though no one intends it.”322 Thus, 
the sorting of America into a “new upper class” and a “new lower class” 
portends the “selective collapse” of American community, and thus, of 
American exceptionalism.323 
Men are the primary culprits, as Murray tells the tale. They are less 
industrious, less responsible, and less likely to marry the mothers of their 
children. Thus, the rise in male irresponsibility has serious implications for the 
very stability of civil society and, ultimately, of the political order.324 
A. The Marriage Divide Between the New Upper Class and the Rest of 
America 
How does Murray evaluate the growing marriage divide and its impact on 
children? Like Rosin, he devotes chapters to both sides of the divide. The story 
he tells about the marriage “haves,” so to speak, is of assortative mating, or 
what Murray calls “cognitive homogamy”: the most highly educated people 
marry each other and live in elite communities, or “super zip codes,” 
segregated from other social classes.325 To be sure, “before the age of 
mobility,” there was some homogamy – “people commonly married someone 
from the same town or from the same neighborhood of an urban area” – but 
whether there was “cognitive homogamy” was more “haphazard.”326 Today, 
even college graduates sort themselves; those “from elite colleges are likely to 
marry other graduates from elite colleges.”327 Murray, whose prior work, The 
Bell Curve, includes a controversial examination of intelligence,328 asserts that 
these parents, graduates of elite institutions, transmit cognitive ability to the 
next generation, which helps the elite “maintain[] its status across 
generations.”329 Genetics alone does not do the entire job, however; Murray 
also stresses how the new upper class grooms its children for success.330 
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In this “new kind of segregation,” the new upper class lives apart and 
differently from the rest of America.331 Similar to the State of Our Unions 
2012 report discussed above, Murray’s book contrasts the growing divide 
between the lives of the upper class and those of the rest of America with what 
happened in an earlier era. He explains these trends, and what has happened to 
the founding virtues from 1960 to 2000, by describing two “fictional 
neighborhoods,” Belmont and Fishtown.332 Thus, in places like Belmont, an 
upper-class neighborhood, one infers that the founding virtues of marriage, 
responsibility, honesty, and industriousness continue to flourish. By contrast, 
although those same virtues flourished in Fishtown during the 1960s, when it 
was a white working-class neighborhood, today there is a stark divide and 
Fishtown exemplifies the new lower class.333 
In his survey of the decline of the virtues, Murray begins with “class 
divergence in marriage” because, “[o]ver the last half century, marriage has 
become the fault line dividing American classes.”334 Formerly, even though the 
wealthy differed from the middle and working class because they were, well, 
wealthier, the patterns of family and community life among the wealthy 
differed little from that of the middle and working class: marriage, responsible 
parenting, civic engagement, and the like.335 Now, by contrast, the white 
middle class – particularly the working class or moderately educated middle 
class – is “coming apart” at the seams: nonmarital births have become the 
norm. The new upper class, meanwhile, does not repudiate marriage. Marital 
births are the norm, albeit often after a protracted investment in the human 
capital of young adults.336 In its model of investment, this story is consistent 
with McLanahan’s picture of “diverging destinies.” Murray illustrates this 
divergence in his portraits of the real Belmont and Fishtown. He reports data 
showing that from 1997 to 2004, ninety percent of children in the real Belmont 
were living with both biological parents when the mother turned forty. In the 
real Fishtown the number was “sinking below the 30 percent level.”337 Murray 
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identifies a shift in norms about marriage as the expected site for parenthood, 
suggesting, consistent with McLanahan, the declining hold of the shotgun 
wedding. While “the traditional norm in Fishtown had not necessarily been 
‘get married and then get pregnant and have a baby,’” “[q]uite frequently, it 
had been ‘get pregnant, then get married and have a baby.’”338 A “drastic” shift 
from either of these norms was evident even by the mid-1980s, however, when 
more high school-age girls were getting pregnant and not marrying.339 Murray 
considers the reasons for this shift, rejecting “lack of information about family 
planning.”340 Instead, he suggests a mixture of pregnancies that “just 
happened,” but were not, in contrast to past practice, “followed by marriage”; 
pregnancies that were wanted in order to achieve status by having a baby; and 
“pregnancies . . . welcomed as a way to get out of the house,” to move in with 
a boyfriend, or to go on welfare.341 
B. Irresponsible Men, Unmarried Mothers, and the Decline of Social Capital 
Some attention to Murray’s critique of male irresponsibility as a falling 
away from the founding virtues will afford a useful comparison with Rosin. In 
the chapter “The Real Fishtown,” Murray steps back from telling the story of 
the new (white) lower-class neighborhoods through statistics and begins to 
describe actual people in an actual town. The basic motif is one of “many adult 
men in a community [] living off relatives or girlfriends,” which results in 
placing “lots of stress on the community.”342 He considers the decline in male 
“industriousness” and of townspeople describing men “who just couldn’t seem 
to cope with the process of getting and holding a job.”343 The problem for 
family structure is that unmarried men who father children may be “nice” guys 
who are “sorry,” but for the most part, they do not “end up being fathers to 
their children.”344 Murray asserts: “Children need fathers, and the next 
generation in a community with lots of children without fathers is in 
trouble.”345 This problem contributes to the decline of social capital. 
Why marriage matters, Murray argues, pertains not just to the organization 
of communities, but also because of the “socialization of the next 
generation.”346 He contends that “the family structure that produces the best 
outcomes for children, on average, are two biological parents who remain 
married.”347 “Never-married women,” he reports, “produce the worst 
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outcomes.”348 With this metric, then, the decline of marriage and the 
“collapse” of the family in places like Fishtown is dire because “[f]amilies 
with children are the core around which American communities must be 
organized” because they “have always been, and still are, the engine that 
makes American communities work.”349 
Murray also stresses the diverging destinies of the Belmonts and Fishtowns 
of America from 1960 to 2010 with respect to the virtue of industriousness 
among white men.350 Men in Fishtown, for example, lack work because they 
lack industriousness, not because of the disappearance of jobs.351 He reports 
comments by Fishtown residents that young men just “don’t have the 
ambition,” that they have male role models who are “not working or on 
unemployment,” and that they simply “ha[ve] no interest in holding a job or 
having a family.”352 Murray is also suspicious of the rising rate of disability 
among men, suggesting they learn to get by on disability income while 
working “under the table.”353 Men also “live off” women who receive welfare 
payments.354 We learn that “such men are known as ‘runners’ or ‘fly by 
nights,’ because they are constantly on the move, avoiding debt collectors, 
child support collectors, their girlfriends or children, or the police. They, too, 
are active in the drug trade, which exploded” in Fishtown in the 1980s.355 
His bottom-line measure, whether a household has “someone working at 
least forty hours a week,” reveals a marked downward trend: in 1960, 81% of 
Fishtown households and 90% of Belmont households met this barometer; by 
March 2012 the qualifying Fishtown households had dropped to 53% while 
Belmont households only experienced a 3% decline, to 87%.356 
Critics of Murray challenge his diagnosis of male unemployment as a moral 
problem – the deterioration of virtue – rather than as a result of the deep 
recession and structural economic problems disproportionately affecting 
working-class men.357 The interplay between personal and public 
responsibility, or between personal choices and economic constraints, is 
important because an emphasis on the loss of virtue cries out for cultural 
solutions, while an emphasis on economic structures calls out for economic 
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policy. The gender dynamic that Murray finds in both real and fictional 
Fishtown is similar to that which Rosin reports: men are often a net drain on 
the women with whom they share children. While Rosin tends to stress the 
energy, drive, and determination of the women she profiles, however, the 
women in Murray’s account do not escape blame for moral failings. In 
discussing the increasing number of teenage females in Fishtown getting 
pregnant, Murray reports a school teacher’s view that “not knowing how to be 
mothers is a big problem,” as such young mothers “‘want to “do” for their kids 
but do not know how.’”358 Often, siblings take care of siblings and children 
learn “how to take care of themselves.”359 Also, grandparents are often raising 
their grandchildren.360 In a passage all too reminiscent of some of the rhetoric 
from the 1990s about the type of mothers who received Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children benefits, Murray comments: 
Alongside the women who didn’t get married but are trying hard to be 
good mothers are those who are the horror stories that workers in the 
child protective services exchange – mothers who use three-year-olds to 
babysit for infants while they go out for the evening; homes where the 
children are brain damaged because the latest live-in boyfriend makes 
meth in the kitchen sink; and the many cases of outright physical and 
emotional abuse by never-married women who are not just overburdened 
mothers but irresponsible or incompetent ones.361 
One significant difference between Murray’s portrait of irresponsible 
mothers and the horror stories told by Congressmen in the 1990s is that, for 
many of its critics in those debates, the “color of welfare”362 was black. 
Murray’s stories, by contrast, are about the failings of the new white American 
lower class and the “selective collapse” of American community.363 
Similar to Murray’s indictment of men for their employment, Murray 
diagnoses a falling away from marriage in terms of a loss of virtue. He fails to 
consider the interplay of culture and economics in the class-based gap between 
marital aspirations and practices among the marriage have nots. For this 
reason, he fails to consider how public policy might address that gap.364 
 
358 MURRAY, supra note 12, at 214. 
359 Id. at 215. 
360 Id. at 214-15. 
361 Id. at 210; cf. McClain, supra note 11, at 450 (describing rhetoric about welfare 
mothers). 
362 See generally JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: HOW RACISM UNDERMINED 
THE WAR ON POVERTY (1994).  
363 MURRAY, supra note 12, at 236-52. 
364 CAHN & CARBONE, FAMILY CLASSES, supra note 46 (manuscript at 66) (critiquing 
Murray for not recognizing that Americans may share cultural aspirations to marry, but that 
forces beyond the control of the individual may make realizing those aspirations 
impossible). 
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C. Gender Dynamics and Gender Roles in the New Upper Class 
How do gender dynamics look, in comparison, in the family lives of the new 
elites living in their super-zip-code neighborhoods? Murray disappoints on this 
question, perhaps because he does not devote a parallel chapter to lives in the 
real Belmont. He begins with an interesting survey revealing the chronological 
shift in women’s attitudes about marriage, family, and career from 1960 to 
2010. Thus, Murray recounts a 1962 Gallup poll, commissioned by the 
Saturday Evening Post, which found that ninety-six percent of wives surveyed 
believed that a “‘girl who is married and has a family to raise’” is happier than 
“‘the unmarried career girl,’” and ninety-three percent of those wives “said that 
they did not, in retrospect, wish they had pursued a career instead of getting 
married.”365 Unsurprising for that time, most married women said that between 
the ages of twenty and twenty-three was the ideal time for women to marry, 
with a mere eighteen percent believing a woman “should wait until age 25 or 
older.”366 Married women strongly endorsed the norm of fidelity for husbands 
and wives. Another contemporaneous poll, taken before states adopted no-fault 
divorce laws, found that a strong majority of people thought divorce should be 
made more difficult.367 
With that as a baseline, Murray charts shifts in attitudes about “the woman’s 
role in marriage.”368 One graph shows a sharp decline, from 1977 through the 
1980s, in the percentage of whites aged thirty to forty-nine who agreed with 
the statement that “women should tend the family.”369 Although “[t]he 
traditional conception of marital roles took a big hit,” a “substantial class 
difference remained”: by the 2000s, “almost 40 percent of Fishtown still took a 
traditional view of the woman’s role, compared to less than 20 percent of 
Belmont.”370 This higher degree of acceptance of women’s changed roles 
seems to fit Murray’s account of assortative mating among the new upper 
class. Murray, however, does not flesh this data out with portraits of the 
dynamics in the marriages, or nonmarital relationships, of citizens in the 
different towns. In his later chapter on industriousness, he reports that “married 
women in Belmont and Fishtown behaved similarly,” as part of the 
“revolution” of married women’s increased participation in the labor force.371 
With respect to unmarried women, he finds an “already wide” gap in 1960, 
with more than ninety percent of college-educated unmarried women in the 
labor force, compared with a peak rate of eighty-three percent in 1983 for 
unmarried women with a high school education.372 Murray does not, however, 
 
365 MURRAY, supra note 12, at 149. 
366 Id. at 149-50. 
367 Id. at 150 (discussing poll from 1960). 
368 Id. at 151. 
369 Id.  
370 Id. 
371 Id. at 184. 
372 Id. at 184-85. 
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offer a satisfactory analysis of this gap, instead presenting data without 
exploring the stories behind those data. 
Murray also reports differences in divorce rates between the towns, with 
similar trajectories until the early 1980s, when the “trendline in Belmont 
flattened” while the trendline in Fishtown “continued steeply upward.”373 
Similarly, the number of married couples that self-reported being “very happy” 
in their marriages seems to have steadily declined in Fishtown, while it has 
been arcing up in Belmont since the 1980s.374 
Religiosity offers a more complicated picture than a stark class divide. 
America still is “exceptional” as compared with “other advanced countries” in 
terms of the percentage of white Americans who are “actively religious.”375 
Thus, while Murray’s data challenge the “conventional wisdom that working-
class white America is still staunchly religious while white American elites are 
dominated by secular humanists,” he cannot paint a picture of an intensely 
religious, hence virtue-drenched, Belmont and an irreligious, hence virtue-
lacking, Fishtown.376 Secularization is widespread. Nonetheless, he does find a 
higher percentage of religiously disengaged in Fishtown (59%) than in 
Belmont (41%).377 His basic claim here is that, to the extent that “religion” is 
“one of the key sources of social capital in a community,” if a town has more 
active churchgoers, it will have more people to serve not only in the church but 
also in that community’s various charitable activities.378 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article I have argued for giving attention to “the other marriage 
equality problem,” the growing class-based divide in the United States with 
respect to paths to family formation. I have argued that warnings about 
growing family inequality and its implications for children warrant attention. 
My point of departure was contrasting portraits in the media of what is 
happening to marriage. One portrait is of marriage “haves” and “have nots,” 
with things going well for people who follow a course of investing in their 
education before marrying and becoming parents, and whose children then 
benefit from the parental investment of two parents, and with things going less 
well for people who depart from that script. Another portrait suggested 
resistance to the idea that marriage should be the marker of the good life and of 
responsible citizenship, championing those who remain single, and childless, 
as being happy and as contributing greatly to civil society. To analyze the other 
marriage equality problem, I used as foils Hanna Rosin’s diagnosis of the “end 
of men and the rise of women” and Charles Murray’s account of the marriage 
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divide as part of the class-based “selective collapse of American community.” 
I also argued that Rosin’s account highlights that one aspect of the other 
marriage equality problem is gender equality: how men and women understand 
and navigate gender roles in marital and nonmarital relationships, particularly 
in changing economic circumstances. 
This Article also situated contemporary debates about what is happening to 
marriage in the context of periods of earlier concerns about marriage. During 
congressional debates about welfare reform and, later, the reauthorization of 
TANF, lawmakers paid keen attention to the separation of marriage and 
parenthood among low-income men and women and their “fragile families” 
and to an evident gap between marital aspirations and marital practice. Turning 
to more recent reports on the marriage divide, I highlighted a parallel concern 
over a gap between marital aspiration and practice and the separation of 
marriage and parenthood in a growing segment of Middle America. 
The other marriage equality problem concerns both the ability of adults to 
act on their aspirations for their intimate relationships and the impact upon 
children of growing family inequality in the United States. Both of these 
dimensions of the marriage equality problem are matters within the concern of 
family law and policy. Federal administrative and legislative responses are also 
appropriate. As McLanahan argued, drawing analogies to policies instituted 
during the New Deal era, broader public policies should address the 
consequences of broad demographic changes in patterns of family life. The 
formative project of constitutional liberalism could properly support efforts to 
address family inequality. The scope of such efforts should go beyond family 
policy, narrowly conceived. Thus, in recent work, McLanahan and her Fragile 
Families colleague Irwin Garfinkel propose a range of policies investing in 
children and adults.379 Direct and indirect investments in children would 
include such policies as providing national health insurance, universal pre-
kindergarten, and paid parental leave; investments in parents would include, in 
addition to paid parental leave, revisiting unrealistic child support-obligations 
imposed on low-income fathers, instituting child-support assurance, marriage 
and fatherhood programs focused on relationships skills, and reducing mass 
incarceration.380 McLanahan and Garfinkel sensibly argue that investing in 
“the human capital and the economic and social security of children in fragile 
families” is likely to “reduce the future prevalence of fragile families,” noting 
that “[e]ducational attainment – a critical element of human capital – is not 
only a strong predictor of earnings, but is also one of the strongest predictors of 
marriage and family stability.”381 Finally, they call for educational and 
 
379 Sara S. McLanahan & Irwin Garfinkel, Fragile Families: Debates, Facts, and 
Solutions, in MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS: LAW, POLICY, AND THE BRAVE NEW WORLD 
OF TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY FAMILIES 142, 155-56 (Marsha Garrison & Elizabeth S. Scott 
eds., 2012). 
380 Id. at 154-63. 
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healthcare programs aimed at reducing the incidence of unintended pregnancy 
and early childbearing, including programs encouraging children and young 
people, across class lines, to delay forming a family “until they have found a 
partner with whom they can form a stable union.”382 
There are, of course, difficult normative and empirical questions. On the one 
hand, the fact that marriage is in “decline” may be welcome evidence of a 
loosening up of scripts about what forms adult intimate life and family life can 
take. On this view, perhaps it is a good thing that some people think marriage 
is obsolete or no longer the chief marker of a fulfilling life. Elsewhere, I have 
articulated support, for example, for a diversity approach to family life and to 
parenthood, consonant with family law’s recognition of the growing diversity 
in family life.383 On the other hand, evidence that most Americans share an 
aspiration toward a happy marriage, but that there is a class-based gap in 
whether they achieve that goal, suggests that marriage is not obsolete, for 
many people, but instead perceived to be out of reach. Further, when inequality 
among families also entails inequality among children, this creates concerns 
about social reproduction. McLanahan and Garfinkel, for example, conclude 
that “[f]ragile families are both a consequence and a cause of economic 
disadvantage.”384 
To be sure, studies of child outcomes caution against assuming that a 
particular family form, as such, is the guarantor of child wellbeing. Instead, 
what matters most seems to be the quality of the parent-child relationship, 
access to social and economic resources, and the place of families in their 
broader communities.385 Nonetheless, child poverty is a factor that shapes 
children’s lives and opportunities and single-parent families, generally, are 
more likely to be poor than two-parent families. Moreover, while children may 
fare well in stable single-parent households, household instability that results 
from the complex family patterns that arise as many unmarried mothers and 
 
382 Id. at 163-64. 
383 McClain, supra note 170, at 41-62.  
384 McLanahan & Garfinkel, supra note 379, at 154. 
385 Several contributions to my recent book, WHAT IS PARENTHOOD?: CONTEMPORARY 
DEBATES ABOUT THE FAMILY, supra note 170, discuss child outcomes. See, e.g., Howard 
Steele & Miriam Steele, Parenting Matters: An Attachment Perspective, in WHAT IS 
PARENTHOOD?: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ABOUT THE FAMILY, supra note 170, at 214, 214-
33; Fiona Tasker, Developmental Outcomes for Children Raised by Lesbian and Gay 
Parents, in WHAT IS PARENTHOOD?: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ABOUT THE FAMILY, supra 
note 170, at 171, 184-85. Even strong defenders of marriage as the optimal family form for 
children acknowledge that there are important differences among groups of children. See 
Margaret F. Brinig, A Case for Integrated Parenthood, in WHAT IS PARENTHOOD?: 
CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ABOUT THE FAMILY, supra note 170, at 147, 164 (reporting 
research results that “black children seem to be affected by formal legal relationships far 
less than other racial groups in the United States”). For an older, but still helpful discussion, 
see NANCY E. DOWD, IN DEFENSE OF SINGLE-PARENT FAMILIES (1996). 
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fathers dissolve their relationships and form new partnerships has negative 
consequences for children and their parents.386  
At the same time, discussions about the consequences for children of the 
growing class divide need to be attentive to the risk of a new model of 
parenting and family life where only the most affluent and advantaged parents 
pass muster and the less advantaged and affluent doom their children to an 
inferior life. For example, some responses to Jason DeParle’s portrait of the 
two white mothers, Jessica (single) and Chris (married), as emblematic of two 
classes, “divided by ‘I do,’” criticized the story as “moralizing” against single 
mothers and as suggesting that Jessica’s children were “suffering because of a 
lack of extracurricular activities,” which would somehow doom them to 
becoming “dropouts and teenage parents.”387 Instead, critics argued, why not 
look at the resourcefulness of mothers like Jessica, whose own parenting 
philosophy is that parental involvement (whether there is one parent or two) 
will help children feel that they “can do whatever it is they want to do, whether 
they come from a family with money or a family with not much money.”388 An 
issue deserving further attention in consideration of the social reproduction of 
advantage – and disadvantage – is how class shapes models of parenting and 
what parents believe they should do for their children to prepare them for 
success in life.389 
I will conclude by observing an irony. Back in the 1990s, when Congress 
debated welfare reform and politicians indicted the welfare poor as out of 
touch with core American values of family, work, and responsibility, some 
politicians and conservatives laid some of the blame at the door of baby-
boomer liberals, whom they viewed as being elitist, self-indulgent, and 
themselves out of touch with mainstream American values. Pundits charged 
that baby boomers’ war against traditional values had trickled down to the 
 
386 McLanahan & Garfinkel, supra note 379, at 151-54; see also KATHRYN EDIN & 
TIMOTHY NELSON, DOING THE BEST I CAN: FATHERHOOD IN THE INNER CITY 226 (2013) 
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16, 2012, 2:04 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/roiphe/2012/07/single_mothers 
_always_falling_apart_.html. 
388 Id. (quoting Jessica Schairer). 
389 See generally ANNETTE LAREAU, UNEQUAL CHILDHOODS: CLASS, RACE, AND FAMILY 
LIFE (2d ed. 2011) (discussing contrasting models of “concerted cultivation” among the 
more affluent and “natural growth” among the less affluent). 
 2013] THE OTHER MARRIAGE EQUALITY PROBLEM 969 
 
poor, with disastrous consequences, since the poor had less to fall back on.390 
That is why, for example, Murphy Brown was so dangerous as a role model. 
Twenty years later, pundits like Murray now lament that the white middle class 
and working class have fallen away from traditional family values and the 
founding virtues; the college-educated elites, meanwhile, embrace virtues of 
marriage and industriousness and are the ones with more stable marriages, low 
divorce rates, and low rates of nonmarital births. That elite, he argues, should 
be more willing to preach the founding virtues to the rest of America, but they 
do not. McLanahan puts this in a less inflammatory way in her caution about 
diverging destinies: how can public policy encourage lower-income men and 
women to accept the behaviors of those in the top income quartile, so that they 
“delay childbearing, invest in education and training, and form stable 
partnerships” before having children?391 In addition, how can public policy 
encourage men from disadvantaged backgrounds to “remain committed to their 
children?”392  
Murray’s indictment of a broad swath of Americans for their decline in 
virtue also brings us back to the perennial debates about the interplay of 
personal and public responsibility; or the respective roles of character, culture, 
and structural barriers to equality and opportunity. Rosin’s diagnoses raise 
similar questions. Is there economic opportunity for the hapless men Murray 
and Rosin describe if they would just grasp it? Are gender conventions holding 
men hostage so that they, unlike women, simply cannot grow, evolve, and 
adapt? Or are there bigger structural barriers that would remain even if men 
were willing to become more like women? What about social or cultural 
obstacles to accepting more women as family breadwinners and finding an 
approach to work-family conflict that accommodates that role? I have argued 
that one dimension of the other marriage equality problem is negotiating 
gender roles and gender equality within marital and nonmarital relationships. 
The tensions Rosin found in her couples over women’s changing family roles 
seem mirrored in the broader society. Public opinion surveys suggest that, as a 
record forty percent of American families now have women as the primary 
 
390 Andrew Rosenthal, Quayle Says Riots Sprang from Lack of Family Values, N.Y. 
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breadwinners, the public is “conflicted.”393 On the one hand, the “vast 
majority,” seventy-nine percent, of those surveyed do not believe that women 
should “return to their traditional roles.”394 On the other hand, fifty-one percent 
believe “children are better off if a mother is home and doesn’t hold a job;” 
only a minimal percent say the same thing about a father.395 Moreover, the 
prevailing public opinion is that having females as breadwinners makes it 
easier for families to live comfortably, but it also makes it more difficult to 
have successful marriages and raise children.396 Clearly, there is unfinished 
business on this issue. 
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